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The purpose of this paper is to compare the early develop­
ment of nationalism of two peoples of the Balkans, the Serbians and the 
Romanians. The struggle for fulfillment of aspirations to fona 
national states and the awakening of a national consciousness among 
these p~oples were not identical. The paths of development of the 
two national movements diverged in certain important ways due to spe­
cific differences in social structure, economy and relations with the 
Great Powers. However, they were fundamentally parallel as a result 
of their common involvement in the historical process occurring in the 
Balkans during the nineteenth century, the decay of the power of the 
Porte and resulting need to fill a power vacuum in this strategic area. 
The national movement of Serbia, from the 1804 rebellion against the 
Janissaries to the 1866 removal of all Turks from Serbian soil, will be 
contrasted with Romania's national struggle, starting with the 1821 
revolt led by Tudor Vladimirescu and culminating in the union of the 
Principalities in 1861. In the course of this presentation the fun­
damental similarities and differences between the paths taken by each 
of these nationalities in order to achieve its goals will be identified 
and ey.plained. 
Nationalism is a vital force in the Balkans today. It serves to 
unify the people of some states, such as Romania, and may be relied 
upon by the political leadership to generate popular support. In 
multi-national states, such as Yugoslavia, nationalistic sentiments 
,; 
can be a source of tension. and may threaten to destroy the unified 
state. Nationalism is a significant determinant of the shape of the 
contemporary Balkans. 
Nationalism first started to emerge as a political force among 
the peoples of the Balkans in the nineteenth century, transforming 
that region into a powderkeg in the first decades of the twentieth 
century. The development of national consciousness and nationalism in 
the Balkans had tremendous repercussions in the history of Europe. ig­
niting the fuse which touched off World War I. The Balkan peninsula, 
gateway between the east and west, fragmented as it is into about a 
dozen national groups, remains today a politically sensitive region. 
A study of the roots of Balkan nationalism will facilitate the under­
standing of that area today. 
Nationalism continues to play an important role on the world 
poHtical scene. particularly as it develops in the Third Wor.1d coun­
tries which participate in international affairs to an ever-greater 
extent. The emergence of national identity and nationalism in these new 
states is similar tn many ways to the development of nationalism in 
the Balkan countries. If a better understanding of the development 
of Balkan nationalism could be achieved, then perhaps this process 
among the peoples of the Third World could also be better understood. 
Due to the broad scope of the question posed. the challenge 
presented by Balkan languages. and problems related to the availa­
bility of primary sources. English-language secondary sources have 
been relied upon in general in the research for this paper. The 
bibliography lists the major resources tapped, including standard 
.1 
histories of the Balkans, Serbia and Romania; monographs and ar­
ticles dealing with particular aspects of the national development 
of these Balkan peoples; comparative social historical collections 
and books concentrating on Balkan nationalism. The historical nar­
rative has been only ~ightly footnoted; the reader interested in 8mpli~ 
fication of the course of events may refer to the texts named in the 
bibliography which provided the background material for this work. 
The present paper lays the groundwork for a comparison of the 
emergence of nation81ism in Serbia and Romania~ but it is by no means 
exhaustive. Additional studies might be undertaken which would relate 
current theories of nationalism to the movements discussed here, 
apply the conclusions of this work to an analysis of the future 
courses of the two national moveaents, or interpret present ob­
servations in the broad context of nation-building, analyzing their 
implications for the growth of nationalism today. 
Defini tiona 
It is of particular importance in a study of this nature to define 
key terms which will be used throughout. the following definitions are 
based on those offered by Peter Sugar in ~at~onalism in Eastern Europe. 
A nationality is "a group of people of all classes, religious per­
suasions,. professions, and educational levels who are distinguishable 
from all others by speaking the same languase, sharing in Bome of those 
cultural values that are tied to the use of a particular languase and 
springing from a certain undefinable yet real feeling of kinship."t 
A ~~ is the land inhabited by a nationality. 
A ~ is a political-administrative unit, resulting historically 
not from a natural affinity of the members of a society for each other, 
but rather from the imposition of order from a prince or other leader. 
Thus the state is an acquired characteristic of a society. The territory 
of a state is not necessarily the same as that of a country. A state may 
include one of more nationalities, and does not necessarily inciude all 
the members of any particular nationality. 
A nation or nation state is a state which has won the loyalty of 
I 
its population. It senerally is associated with only one nationality, 
though others .may be. involved, often creating minority problems. 
Nationalism, as Sugar points out, doesn't fit neatly into the. ~ 
scheme of natural versus acquired attributes of a group of people. 
Nationalism is a revolutionary idea, transmitted not through institutions 
or by custom, but generated and passed on to new generations by use of 
propaganda. Highest allegiance is given to the nation, militant enthu­
1. Peter Sugar and Ivo Lederer, Nationalism in Eastern Europe, Seattle, 
1969, p. 4 
-
siasm promotes the belief in the superiority or sense of mission of the 
nation. Nationalism makes sense in the context of the centralized 
nation state as it developed in western Europe. Nationalism, however, 
as a result of the influence of western thought, emerged in the Balkans 
despite the nonexistence of the nation state, and continues to appear 
in other parts of the world among people who, being of one nationality 
but having no nation state in which to promote their interests, strive 
to create their own. This usually involves breaking free of a multi­
national state or removing the control of a colonial power. 
National movement denotes the activity of the members of a nation­
ality to form a nation. 
Another term which should be defined is national consciousness. 
As i8 implied, this i8 the sense acquired by the members of a nationality 
that they do indeed share the same language and cultural values. This 
can be distinguished from nationalism clearly: national consciousness 
does not imply that the goal of a nation state is desirable or that 
the nation deserves the people's highest allegiance. National con­
sciousness is a necessary preliminary to nationalism, yet it need not 
always lead to nationalism or a national movement. 
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THE SERBIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT 
The Serbs were the first of the nationalities of the Ottoman 
Empire to seek and win autonomy. Yet the in~la revolt, starting in 1804, 
did not begin as an attempt to free the Serbs from the Ottoman suzerain, 
but rather as an effort to remove from Serbia Janissaries who were ter­
rorizing the populaticn, and to restore a just representative of the 
sultan to the Pashalik of Belgrade. Only in 1807 did the Serbs begin 
to strive for national independence as the Porte gave no evidence that 
it was either strong enough or trustwort~enough to keep promises of 
a fair administration for the Serbs, and as Russia offered military sup­
port to the Serbian rebels. 
The Serbian movement, thus, began as a popular revolt against op­
pression and later turned into a fight for independence. Still, nation­
alism was not an active force in the early Serbian struggles. The Serbian 
of the first decades of the nineteenth century was an illiterate peasant, 
living in a practically self-sufficient extended family or zadruga, in 
a barter economy, WhO wanted the freedom to go about his life in his 
village and district without the interference of excessive taxation or 
exploitation. Although familiar with the legendary glory of the medieval 
Serbian state through popular epic poetry, he had no real desire to re­
establish that state. In this patriarchal society, when in 1816 a form 
of semi-autonomy was granted by the Porte, it took the clever and per­
sistent actions of Knez Milo~ to prevent the breakdown of society into 
military feudal districts with local leaders amassing the power to rule 
their own districts. He forceably centralized the government, enhancing 
his own power and paving the way for a modern state apparatus 
in the second half of the century. In the Pashalik of Be\grade 
at the tim.e of the early nineteenth century rebellions, a. KE:neraJ 
popular oa tiona lism ail1lirig ,·at the ~.re8tion of. a .so,v·erdgn. 
Serbian. state did not exist. Any progress made toward this end 
was a result of diplomatic and political actions taken by Milos and 
the cooperation of Russia, who exerted pressure on the Porte to grant 
the Serbs greater autonomy. 
The aid of the Serbs of Austria, who lived north of the Danube River 
in the Vojvodina, was inst~mental in the military successes of the 
Pashalik Serbs in their revolts. In addition, the Vojvodina provided 
educated men who helped at all levels of government as well as in 
teaching. In a variety of ways, the Serbs of the Austrian Empire who 
lived in a more dynamic society of trade and letters, helped set the stage 
for the cuI tivation of Serbian nationalism. 
In the years after the Porte's recognition of Milos as hereditary 
prince in 1830, Serbian politics were entangled in domestic power strug­
gles. The prince was challenged by the oligar~Yof Constitutionalists 
in the Council who wanted to limit his power and ac~ire more themselves, 
.hiie the Porte continually interfered. As a result, nationalist poli­
cies of the state were virtuall.y nonexistent. . Now that a semi­
autonomous Serbia existed, most energies were directed to the in­
ternal organization of state and distribution of power. Not until the 
1840's did the state seriously occupy itself with nationalistic policies. 
, Starting with the 1844 Nacertanije OMemorandum) of Ilija Garasanin 
which established the South Slavic mission of the Serbs, nationalism 
made real headway in Serbia. Not only did Garasanin envision an in­
ij 
dependent and expanded Serbia, but he espoused the creation of a South 
Slavic union under the leade~hip of the Serbian dynasty. His ideas were 
the basis for Prince Michael's policies in the 1860's, which achieved 
the final removal of all Turks flO m Serbian lands and organized plans 
for a Balkan federation. 
In 1848 the Serbs of the Ottoman Empire had an opportunity to help 
their brothers north of the Danube in their fight for national rights 
against the Magyars. Though the Serbian state did not formally ally 
itself with the .Austrian Serbs d'!.,e' to pressure f.rpm Russia, thousands 
of volunteerscr::ossed the DaJ;l.ube to ..support the Serbian cause. 
Thus by 1862, when Serbia freed itself of direct Turkish inter­
ference, it had already launched a nationalistic policy for the creation 
of an enlarged Serbia, as well as plans for a South Slavic Union with 
Serbia at the helm. 
A combination of factors influenced the Serbian movement for national 
inde:pendence, transforming a popular rebellion against Janissary rapa:.. 
city into a war for liberation &om the Porte. The followlngfactors 
can be identified which shaped the Serbian national movement in its 
early years: social organization, cultural heritage, geographical 
location, Austrian wars with the Turks in the Pashalik, the Serbian 
community of the Habsburg Empire, the oppression of Janissaries no long­
er controllable by the weakening Ottoman government, Great Power re­
lations, economic and sucial changes. These factors will be discussed 
in detail in the following sections. 
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Background 
Ths social organization of the Serbian people in the Pashalik of 
Belgrade determined that the struggle against Janissary oppression 
would be a mass movement. At the beginning of the nineteenth cen­
tury, as part of the legacy of Turkish rule, there was no Serbian no­
bility, upper class, or middle class in the Pashalik of Belgrade. 
When the Turks conquered the area in the fourteenth century, the native 
Serbian aristocracy either fled, perished or was pauperized and lost 
its identity. The Turkish system of rule provided that a Turkish pasha 
would govern the territory and that Ottomans would serve as judges and 
landholders, This system prevented the rise of a native nobility, so 
the Serbs were peasants, rural dwellers engaged in animal husbandry 
and subsistence farming. Cities had a non-Serbian air, a8 they were 
inhabited by Turks, Jews, Greeks and other foreigners~ 
The Serus lived in zadrugas, eytended families consisting of up to 
between forty and siyty members. Each zadruga was part of a village, 
which was governed by a COuncil of Elders headed by a knez elected from 
among the elders. Local self-government was independent of Turkish 
interference, as the TUrkish landholders or sipahis usually lived in 
towns and came to the village only to receive tayes collected by the 
knez. The knez and council were peasants of the village, but generally 
family heads, and often from families of good standing, highly respected 
in the village. Villages were grouped together into a district, ruled 
by a Serbian oborknez, selected from among the knezes. 
The local churches were headed by Orthodoy priests or deacons who 
often were barely literate. The language of the church, Slavo-Serbian, 
differed from the spoken idiom of the Serbs. Some young boys whose 
parents hoped they would be monks learned their letters from the local 
priests. The most fortunate attended school in the Vojvodina, which had 
" 
It) 
progressed more rapidly. In cities the church was headed by 
Greek officials, for the Serbian patriarchate had been aboltshed in 
1766, and Phanariots were appointed to the church hierarchy until 1831 
when the Serbian patriarchate was restored. Church positions were of­
ten purchased and corruption was common. Corruption and the use of 
Greek liturgy alienated the Serbs from the church during this period,. 
The church through the centuries served a vital function in main­
taining the Serbian nationality. .The Turks did not believe in 
forceable conversion to the Moslem religion and ba~ed their'empireon 
the separate e~istence of religions. The empire was divided into 8dmini~· 
'strative units called millets according ,to religion. ,The Pashalik of 
Belgrade was part ,of the orthodox Christian millet and fell under the 
jurisdiction of "the Greek Patriarch of, constantinople. Despite Greci­
fieation of the church, religious identity and separate religious ad­
ministration kept the Serbs from being assimilated. into MOslem cu1~ 
ture, and helped maintain a separate gxup identity. In 1557 the Serbian 
Patriarchate was recreated, and until 1766 the church served a8 protector 
of the Serbian national identity. Under Greek administration after 1766 
the local churches were little affeeted, as most priests eould hardly 
even read Slavo..Serbian, ; much less Greek. The church launched several 
young Serbian national leaders on their way, including Dean Matija Nena­
dovie. a leader in the Serbian insurrection and prominent statesman and 
eonstitutionalist in later years. 
The Se~bian insurrection of 1804-1813 has been looked on by some 
observers as the popular struggle to recreate the great medieval Serbian 
kingdom of Stephen Dulan and the Nemanja dynasty.2 '~ is true that 
~.Vala~C'ubrilovit:ts views are' summarized in Roger Paxton, "Nationalism
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the story of medieval Serbia and its tragic fall at the battle of 
Kosovo in 1389 has been sung for centuries by the bards of the Serbian 
peasantry. Epic poetry and the oral tradition have played an important 
part in the preservation of Serbian national consciousness. . Recent 
. writers,. however, assert that whi~e the oral tradition. helped create 
a ~erbian national consciousness, it diftnot.generatea popular f~ght 
3
for the rev:ival of t~e .medieval' Serbian killgdom. . 
Life in the Pashalik of Belgrade was fairly static. The Turkish 
administrators and Greek, Jewish and other merchants confined their ac­
tivities to the larger towns and cities, while the Serbian peasants 
kept to the countryside. In general, trade was minimal - a barter 
economy predominated and the zadrugas were virtually self-sufficient, 
having enough hands fot the division of labor. The major economic ac­
tivity of the Serbs was pig-raising. By the beginning of the nine­
teenth century Serbian peasants were taking large numbers of pigs north 
to Austria to sell. These pig merchants thus had contact with both the 
Serbs of Austria and the Austrians themselves and came to play an im­
portant role in the st·ru6g1e against the Turks, Milos Obrenovic being 
a foremost example of this element of Serbian society. 
The Ufe of the Serbian peasant under Turkish rule was not overly op­
pressive until the central government started to lose control of the 
Janissaries. Before the nineteenth century in Serbia, the land was in 
the hands of about 900 Turkish sipahis who were granted the land, called 
3. Ibid~ pp. 337-362 
timars, in return for military service. The sipahi had the use of part 
of the timar and the peasants held hereditary right to usufruct 
on the rest of the land in exchange for certain ti~hes and 
duties. In general-the peasant's obligations to the sipahi consisted 
of about one tenth of the household's produce, as well as taxes paid 
to the sult~n and local government; a small amount of corvee or unpaid' .. 
labor for the sipahi and also for public purposes. In exchange, the 
peasant's claim was hereditary, and he could not be evicted as 
long as he worked) the land. He was free to leave the land, but then 
would lose the right to usufruct. This system was quite satisfactory for 
the peasants, and the social organization of Serbian society adjusted 
to the economic and legal Q)nditions. 
Problems however emerged as the central government of the Ottoman 
Empire started to weaken. The loss of territory in Europe, Africa and 
Asia meant that soldiers and administrators had to move back toward the 
center, directing their attention to gaining more power and wealth. 
To protect the capital the sultan sent the Janissaries, who were viewed 
as an immediate threat to the central government, to the orl1ying areas 
of the empire, and thus to the Palhalik of Belgrade. These Janissaries 
forced the peasants to give up their heredbary plots and made them ten­
ants on the landholdings which became known as chifliks. The peasants 
could be evicted and were required to pay high rents, ranging from one 
fourth to one half of their gross product. This development offended 
<the Serbian peasants who believed that he ~o tills the land should 
own it. It created great hardships for the Serbs, many of whom 
reacted to the formation of chifliks by migrating (about 30,000 fled to 
the Habsburg Empire) and by armed resistance and brigandage. 
Thousands of Serbs joined the Austrians in their war with Turkey 
from 1788 to 1791 as a result of Janissary misrule. Although Austria, 
which had occupied the Pashalik of Belgrade, was forced to return it 
, 
to the Ottomans, the war was not without important consouences for the 
future Serbian struggle with the Turks. The Treaty of Sistova of 
1791, which concluded the Austro-Turkish war, called for basic reforms 
in the administration of the Pashalik, including removal of the 
Janissaries. These reforms were carried out by Selim III and probably 
the best-loved pasha of Belgrade, Hadji Mustafa, called the '~other 
of the Serbs." I t was the Serbs' efforts to regain the reforms of 
Hadji Mustafa which led to the 1804 revolt and began the eventual 
struggle for independenC!:! from the weakening Ottoman government. 
The Austro-Turkish war affected the development of Serbian leader­
ship and fighting forces significantly. Those who fought for Austria 
returned to Serbia with knowledge about the organization and tacti~s 
of the Austrian ammy which! could be applied to the Serbian confronta­
tion with the Turks. They made contacts with ,the peoples north of the 
Danube, including merchants who could provide weapons and ammunition, 
and military and political leaders who could be of assistance in fight~ 
ing and diplomacy. The leader of the first Serbian insurrection, 
Karadjordje, wasanong the Serbs of the Pashalik who had joined with 
Austrian fighting forces. When the opportunity arose, he would have 
need to call on the Austrians to reciprocate with volunteers, arms and 
diplomatic intervention. 
i40 
Thus, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Serbs of the Pasha­
lik of Belgrade were almost exclu.sive1y illiterate peasants, with a com~ 
mon sense of an earlier great Serbia, interested only in living their 
lives without interference from outsiders who demanded high tithes and 
who expropriated them from family holdings. Though living in a static 
society in general, some Serbs had experi~nce of fighting in Austrian 
armies and had made contacts with the culturally more advanced Serbs 
of the Habsburg Empire. The stage was set for three quarters of a cen­
tUfy of struggle for freedom from TuTkish rule. 
The Revolts: 1804-1813 
The period between 1804 and 1813 saw marked changes in the relations 
of the Serbs to the Porte and in the cultural activities of the Serbs 
south of the Dmube. 
The Treaty of Sistova reQUired that Selim III remove all Janis­
saries from the Pashalik of Belgrade. Selim authorized Hadji Mustafa 
to carry out this task, but didn't provide him _wi th the means to carry 
it through. So in 1798 Hadji Mustafa organized the Serbs into an armed 
force to push the Janissaries out of the Pashalik. The Janissaries fled 
to Vidin where Pasvan-Oglu had established his own rebel state. However, 
armed and organized rayahs in a semi~autonomous state within the Otto­
man Empire seemed a greater threat to the Porte than the Janissaries, and 
the sultan ordered that the Janissaries be allowed to return to the Pasha­
11k of Belgrade. In 1801 the Janissaries killed Hadji Mustafa and insti­
tuted a reign of terror under four Janissary leaders - the dahis. The 
sultan, asked for support by the Serbs, reprimanded the dahis for their 
lawless behavior. The Janiasaries countered by massacring a number of 
lj 
Serbian knezes. Thus began the 1804 revolt, led by Karadjordje, a knez 
who, having escaped the Janissaries, pulled together scattered guerilla 
g!'Q1PS into an effective 0PPOI ition force. 
The main aim of the Serbian rebels at the outset of the first 
insurrection was to restore the conditions of Ottoman rule that had 
been instituted as a result of the Treaty of Sistova. The removal of 
the Janissaries was the prime demand. T~e assurance of oomplete car­
rying out of any settlement by the participation of a third power, either 
Austria or Russia, in the signing of the settlement was also insisted 
upon by the Serbs. They had already experienced calamity when Selim 
reversed himself on the Sistova promise to remove the Janissaries. The 
Serbs wanted to be certain that if either party should fail to uphold its 
side of the bargain, a third party wuuld be able to place the blame and 
perhaps lend at least diplomatic support to the wronged party. It was 
on this point that all talks failed. 
In 1806 the sultan offered the Serbs an arrang~ent, known as Icko's 
agreement, which would have provided that the Serbs share administrative 
and military responsibilities with the Turkish authorities, a hereditary 
supreme prince would rule jointly with the pasha, and Serbian troops 
would join an equal force of Ottoman regulars in defending the borders~ 
Despite the obvious advantages included in this proposal, the Serbs turned 
it down on the basis that the Porte would allow no third power to witness 
the signing. In addition, Russia was launching an attack on Turkey and 
encouraged the Serbs to join her. It was in 1807 that the Serbian move­
ment':a goal shifted from the restoration of just Ottoman rule to the 





Historians do not agree on the extent to which the revolt of 
1804 was a popular peasant uprising or a movement spearheaded by knezes 
who sometimes may have resorted to coercion to get the peasantry to rise 
in arms. H.W.V. Temperley views the revolt as a spontaneous popular 
uprising against Janissary misrule while Stephen Fischer-Galati and 
Lovett F.Edwards indicate that the peasants were instigated and per­
~ 4haps sometimes coerced t~4ight by local leaders. Likewise, historians 
of the Serbian insurrection debate the role that nationalism played 
in the demands of the Serbian leadership and in th~ carse of the in8ur­
rection. Roger Paxton presents an excellent overview of the major theories 
and data used to support them. 5 
The Serbian leadership until 1807 had not regarded national inde­
pendence as a viable possiHlity. The changing realities of the mili ­
tary, diplomatic and politic. scenes and the flexibility of Karadjordje 
and other Serbian leaders led to a variety of contrasting and contra­
dictory prop08a~s for a settlement satisfactory to Serbia throughout 
the early years of the rebellion. The initial demands of the Serbs 
centered on _ a guarantee of the removal of Janissaries_ But as the 
conflict progressed and the Serbs tasted military succes~ the idea of a 
tributary regime based on the rights of self-rule became much more 
attractive than Turkish provincial rule. By l807-theSerbs had de­
manded full independence. 
4. H.W.V. Temperley, History of Serbia, London, 1919, pp.167-l68; 
Stephen Fischer-Galati, "The Peasantry as a Revolutionary Force in the 
~alkans," Journal of Central European Affairs, Vol. 23, No.1•... p. 16; 
Lovett F. Edwards, The Memoirs of Prota Matija Nenadovic, Oxford, 1969, 
P·xvi 
5. Paxton, op. cit., pp. 337-362 
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At the same time as Serbian ideas of an acceptable settlement were 
getting bolder, the Serbs were exploring the possibilities of foreign 
sponsorship of the insurrection. At the outset they turned to Austria, 
requesting annexation of the pashalik to the Habsburg territory. When 
Austria asserted its neutrality, the Serbs requested that Russia pro­
vide protection to the B~lgrade pashalik similar to that given the Danu­
bian Principalities so that Janissary misrule could be ended. Nego­
tiations on this scheme continued until 1807. But meanwhile, in July 
1804, Bekir Pasha accepted nine Serbian conditions for pacification of 
the pashalik. These were similar to the reformist government of Radji 
Mustafa with the added provision that a Serbian supreme knez would su­
pervise the assessment, collection and delivery of tribute and taxes to 
the pasha. The Turks, however, refused to accept the tenth condition, 
that Austria oversee the carrying out of the settlement. The Serbs, 
seeking a more certain settlement, petitioned Russia once 
again for protection of an autonomous Serbia sti U tributary to the Porte. 
They simultaneously requested Austria's protection. Later the Serbian 
leaders renewed talks with the Porte, no longer mentioning the parti ­
cipation of a third power in the peace talk~while requesting that 
Serbia become an autonomous province within the Ottoman Empire. The 
Turks rejected this proposal, and in late 1805 planned a massive attack 
on the pashalik. This spurred the Serbians to expand their military ac­
tivities. In 1806 the Serbs made pleas to Turkey, Russia and Austria to 
form an international court of justice to judge the Serbs' cause and at ­
tempted to win Russia over as an ally. Russia, preoccupied with 
Napoleon, neglected the Serbs, so they l:p.opened talks with the': rurks. 
-----
The Icko agreement was a result of these talks. But Russia, now ready 
to fight Turkey over the Danubian Principalities, threw its weight on the 
side of the Serbs, who therefore rejected the Icko offer. 
Paxton asserts that the variety of solutions which the Serbs deemed 
acceptable and the lack of any overriding goal of uniting all Serbs in 
an independent state indicate that the Serbs did not have a highly de­
veloped national consciousness. The precedence that provincial or paro­
chial interests took over national concerns resulted from the cultural 
backwardness and intellectual isolation of Serbia. The Serbs were looking 
for new, more just masters, not for independence in a modern Serbian 
nation state. Paxton appraises the situation: 
I~idespread social dislocation, political turmoil and the non­
existence of educational facilities precluded the nationalist in­
doctrination of the rayah. Rudimentary in form and substance, 
Serbian nat ionalism had not yet emerged from a period of ideo­
logical incubation.,,6 
Unfortunately for the Serbs, Russia found it propitious to sign the 
Treaty of Tilsit with Napoleon in 1807 which ended its activity against 
the ottomans until 1809. During these years Russia unsuccessfully tried 
to reach a satisfactory sett~m&t for the Serbs with the Turks, and the 
Serbs in vain looked to Austria and Napoleon's France for aid. Faced with 
a renewed attack in 1809, Karadjordje successfully linked with Monte­
negrin forces. B1ut suffering losses on the eastern front, Serbia was saved 
only by a Russian attack on Turkey that diverted the sultan's troops. 
Austrian diplomatic aid in 1810 did not lead to an acceptable arrange­
ment with the Turks. Russian troops assisted the Serbs until Russia, 
Withdrawing from the Balkans as an invasion by Napoleon seemed imminent~ 
negotiated the Treaty of Bucharest in May, 1812. 




Article VIII of the Treaty of Bucharest dealt with Serbia and was 
bitter fruit indeed for the veterans of eight years of fighting. The 
treaty granted full amnesty to the Serbs, the Turks were to occupy 
all cities and fortresses previously occupied, Serbian-built fortresses 
were to be demolished, and in a clause open to various interpretations' 
the Serbs were to enjoy the same rights as the Archipelago within the Ot­
toman Empire (this involved a degree of self-government to be nego­
tiated). No third party guarantee of the settlement was included. 
Neither the Serbs nor the Turks would accept this treaty. The 
Serbs insisted on an autononous government with only well-defined 
and limited Turkish presence. The Turks woubl1 settle for nothing less 
than the restoration of the pre-insurrection regime. At an impasse, in 
1813 the Turks launched a massive attack. -The Serbian leadership and 
thousands,g£ Serbian peasants fled t:o Austria. A new reign of terror 
began, alleviated tempaarily by a plea for mercy and rationality from 
Dean Matija Nenadovic who r,etninded the Turks that a depopulated and 
ravaged Serbia would be no asset to the Empire. Milos Obrenovic, a 
minor leader in the insurrection who refused to leave Serbia, was chosen 
by the Porte as oborknez of three districts. A clever diplomat, Milos 
strove to keep the Serbs complacent in order to mi~imize reprisals, while 
hoping for assistance from the Great Powers negotiating in Vienna. He 
crushed a local rebellion in 1814, but that did not prevent the TUrks 
from punishing the Serbs. Conditions got so bad that Milos decided to 
launch a new rebellion, what became known as the Second Serbian Insur­
rection, nominally against Suleyman Pasha and not against the Porte. 
Milos was successful both in the field and in his diplomatic relations 
..u 
wit~ various Turkish leaders. With some pressure from Russia, the sulta n 
finally agreed to a settlement which allowed the Serbs to collect the 
taxes without Turkish interference, required that a Serbian knez sit 
alongside the Turkish mUsellim in judgement of any Christian, provided 
that sipahis could take only those dues prescribed by law, forbade 
Janissaries, Bosnians or Albanians from entering the pasha's service, 
established a twelve-man national chancery to judge Serbs for major 
crimes and to deliver tax and tribute to the pasha, and granted Serbs 
the right to keep small aDDS for self-defense. This agreement was the 
basis of Serbian government until 1830 when Milo~ was recognized by the 
Turks as hereditary prince. The arrangement represented a great step 
forward for th~ Serbian state and was instrumental in the later develop­
ment of Serbian nationalism. 
The years of insurrection brought great social and economic dis­
ruption to thePa~lik of Belgrade. Yet certain contributions toward 
the creation of Serhian nationalism were made during this period. An 
important figure is the Banat-born Dositej Obradovic (1739-1814) who 
came to Belgrade during the first insurrection to help establish the 
pashalik's first high school and theological seminary and to assist 
in planning for the founding of about seventy elementary schools. Obrad­
ovic was a proponent of rationalism and enlightenment and wrote stories 
of his experiences for the edification of Serbian youth. Most important, 
he wrote, not in the Slavo-Serbian which the few Serbians who were 
literate had learned to read, ,but in the Serbian vernacular. He thus 
blazed the trail for the development of a Serbian literary language and 
national literature. The school that he founded, unfortunately, closed'in 
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1813 when the Turks recaptured the city, but it marked an important stEp 
forward in the advance of Serbian culture and facilitated the 
wider dissemination of knowledge and ideas. 
Students at the high school included the children of Karadjordje 
and the young Vuk Karad~ic, participant in the insurrections and, in 
years to come, linguist and romantic nationalist, a figure of out­
standing devotion to the cultivation of Serbian culture. 
The First Reign of Milos: 1815-1835 
Milos Obrenovic, through liberal use of power and crafty diplomatic 
maneuvers, did much to advance the status of Serbia within the Ottoman 
Empire. The first reign of Milos is characterized by tensions. and 
adjusenents within society cau$ed by the process of modernization, 
and the discontent generated by the actions of a prince who would not 
share his power. The ach~~ent of an autonomous Serbia led to a con­
centration on internal organization and power distribution, so that the 
accent was not on nationalism during Milo~'s reign. 
From 1815 to 1833, Milos worked toward the winning of autonomy 
for a Serbia with the extended boundari~s that had been occupied by the 
Serbs in 1813. Of particular importance was the recognition by Turkey 
of Milos's status as heredfiary grand prince. Not only did this enhance 
Milos's personal power, but it considerably strengthened Serbia's bar­
gaining position on the ~nternational scer.e. 
As an illiterate peasant livestock merchant, in a still primitive 
land, Milos naturally assumed a patriarchal role in his Serbia. Despite 
the jealousy of local knezes who wanted to rule their districts without 




maximized his control over the government. He appointed officials 
at all levels of government, bringing an end to traditional democratic 
self-government. Some have observed that Milos didn't seem. to recog­
nize any difference between hLaself and the state and would accuse 
a person who didn't cooperate with him on private transactions of being 
a traitor to the state. But the control Milos exerted prevented Ser­
bmfrom splintering into a number of minor knezdoms, laid the founda­
tions for the formation of a modern state, and provided Milos with the 
bargaining power to negotiate successfully with the Porte for Serbian 
autonomy. 
In order to win autonomy from the Turks, Milos e~ercised his 
diplomatic skill. His plan was to prevent Serbia from becoming a 
problem area for the Porte, to gain the sultan's favor by keeping the 
Serbs of the Pashalik peaceful. The sultan would then be more likely 
to give the Serbs autonomy, seeing that they could manage their own 
affairs to the benefit of the empire. At the same time Milo~ made 
free use of bakshish, or bribes, to keep Turkish officials well-dis­
. posed toward the Serbs. These methods alone, however, were not sur­
ficient to gain autonomy. The pressure of Russia, the avowed protector 
of the Serbs (as indicated in the Treaties of Kuchuk Kainardji, 1774;. 
and :Bucharest, 1812), was the key to autonomy. 
Specifically, when Turkey was dealing with the Greek uprising 
which began in 1821, Milos kept the Serbs from joining the revolt. 
They also did not participate in the RUSSO-Turkish war of 1828-29. 
Under the threat of complete destruction by the Russians, the sultan 
agreed to honor the terms of the Trea.ty of Bucharest in the Convention 
of Akkerman (1826) arid the Treaty of Adrianople (1829). Thus, in 1830 a 
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hatti sherif was issued granting Serbia autonomy, recognizing Milos 
as hereditary prince. A Russo-Turkish commission was to establish the 
borders (expanding Serbia to include six districts lost in l8l3) and a 
fixed annual tribute was specified. Arrangements were made for the 
transfer of income from the sipahi estates taken over by Serbs. The 
Turkish government was not to interfere in the Serbian administration 
or judiciary. No Moslems except certain military personnel could live 
in Serbia. Serbia was free to establish its own schools, a domestic 
army, hospitals, printing presses and postal system. The members of 
the Council were not to be dismissed except for serious crimes, and 
Serbia was to have a permanent representative in Coqstantinople. 
Not until 1833 was the final border settlement agreed upon, and 
only after Milos had contrived to occupy. the districts with his anny 
to put down peasant unrest, since the TUrks were dragging their feet. 
In 1831 the Serbian church finally won its autonomy, and the Greek 
metropolitan and bishops were replaced by Serbs. Since the church 
was a significant fa~ of the Serbian national identity, Milo¥ strove 
to rid it of corruption and impurities. The Serbian hierarc~undertook 
to reorganize and upgrade the clergy folLowing the winning of autonomy. 
On the domestic scene, Milos worked to strengthen his own hand as . 
well as to strengthen post-insurrection Serbia. He overawed his council 
and tried to keep its power trivial. He personally supervised appoint­
ments at all levels of government. He put off any discussion of a 
constitution. 
A major problem was the restoration of Serbia's-economy. Much 
1,:" 
land was left deserted after 1815, so Milos promulgated a law encouraging 
settlement and exempting new settlers from taxes for a certain number of 
years. With order restored in the country, land hunger appeared, and 
even the vast forest lands of Serbia, which had been the key to the ear­
lier boomiIgpig-raising eronomy, started to be cleared. 
As Milos appointed local officials, often the peasants wuuld not even 
know the leaders of their own village, where before they had elected 
the heads of leading families as knez. Milos's policy of strengthening 
the central government destroyed the age-old folk democracy, the pea­
sants' participation in local government that they had enjoyed under 
the TUrks. This generated alienation, especially when Milo~'s offi­
cials demanded that ever higher taxes be paid to cover the costs of cre­
ating a bureaucratic central government and bribing the Turks. In ad­
dition, although peasants now were becoming freeho14ers, Milos and 
his cronies required them to participate in corvee work on their own 
private holdings. In fact, during hIs reign Milos amassed great wealth 
by acquiring extensive landholdings, getting free labor at his people's 
expense, and participating in lucrative trade arrangements. There was 
much resentment among the people of Serbia, of Milos's administrative 
changes, and of his growing power and wealth. In the . 
decade before the winning of autonomy Milos had t~ put. down seven 
revolts, in general lQcal rebelilons against abuses of 
power and high taxes. The most important of these was Djak's Rebellion 
in 1924-1925. It culminated in a mass meeting with representatives of 
all twelve districts ~ccording to):he rebels) which presented a list of 
demands to Milos including the replacement of £ertain officials 
with locally elected knezes, end of the corvee for the private benefit 
of public officials, reduction or elimination of taxes and imposts, the 
ending of knez part~~ation in trade, observance of religious fasts and 
more local autonomy. Milos responded by massacring the crowd, executing 
Djak, and calling a public meeting which gave him a vote of confidence. 
Yet there were to be more peasant revolts against the Serbian ruler, for 
the peasantry simply wanted to return to the familiar, stable, rural 
lifestyle and not finance the formation of a national state apparatus. 
National consciousness among the majority of Serbians had not yet been 
transformed into nationalism. Provincial loyalties still rated above the 
interests of a national state. 
In the~urse of Milos's reign the economic life of the Serbian pea­
santry began to undergo dramatic changes. The shift from a barter econo­
my to a money economy, together with free landownership, undermined the 
traditional social unit of the Serbs, the zadruga, and threatened to 
ruin many a peasant unfamiliar with the pitfalls of credit. 
Trade was encouraged by Milos as the Turkish merchants and artisans 
moved out of the cities and Serbs replaced them. Preeani or Serbs from 
Austria moved into Milos·'.s Serbia to fill the ranks of the bureaucracy, 
to trade and to establts~ shops. A certain amount of resentment arose 
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among the native Serbs toward these educated foreigners with a superior 
air, yet they brought with them many novelties from the west which were 
very attractive to peasants and townspeople. Tastes grew more expensive, 
a limited degree of economic differentiation began to take place in the 
villages with the opening of shops and speculation in real estate, and 
temptation to gamble and behave irresponsibly grew. Usurers took advan­
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tage of thenaivet~ of the peasantry until, after the formal elimination 
of feudal bondage in 1833, there seemed to be danger that a great land­
less rural "proletariat," debt-ridden and miserable, would develop. So in 
1836 Milos instituted the Protected Minimum Homestead Act which made it 
illegal to foreclose on a peasant's home, necessary farm land, two oxen 
and a cow. Thus Milos assured that Serbia would be a land of small free­
holders. After 1835 all taxes were payable in money, which meant that 
all peasants had incentive to sell in the market. At the same time that 
the economy was changing from barter to money, animal husbardry was losing 
ground to grain production. This occurred. as a result of the increase 
in population" the new security of the farmer in years of peace, and the 
disappearance of forest lands where pigs had been grazed. Many changes 
and new forces were permanently altering the fabric of Serbian life. Wl~h 
economic changes came exposure to western ideas and the beginning of claSS 
differentiation among the Serbs (notables, bureaucracy, merchant, peasant) 
and greater opportunities for education (including army training and 
theological seminary). By 1838 there were 84 elementary schools in 
Serbia with 2,916 students, and a gymnasium in Belgrade. 7 With each new 
generation of students, the potential of Serbia's educational system 
mul tiplied. 
Milos's reticence to share power led to unrest, tem~ry adoption 
of a liberal constitution in 1836, and imposition of a constitution for­
mulated in Turkey in 1838. Mi1o~ could not function in a system where 
the Council had legislative power and ministers were responsible not to 
the prince but to the Council. The 1838 constitution represented an 




assertion of Ottoman power in Serbia, and thus a reduction is Serbia's 
autonomy, because it required the approval of the Porte to remove any 
of the Council members. Milos abdicated, as he couldn't rule Serbia un­
der the conditions provided in the constitution. 
Constitutionalism and Nationalism 1839-t866 
After the fall of Milos, romantic nationalism and the desire to 
farm a Serbian or even South Slavic state grew to be expressed e~pli­
citly and more widely among the educated in Serbia. Increased contact 
of Serbians with the nationalist and liberal thinkers of Poland, France 
and Germany inspired this development, which had great appeal for the 
small group of educated Serbian youth which emerged as fruit of moderni4 
zation in Serbia. The nationalists of this period looked to the value 
and charm of native Serbian traditions and customs, calling for a 
synthesis of liberal and traditional forms in the realization of an 
independent Serbia. 
After the Russians put down the Polish revolt of 1830-1831 Polish 
leader Prince Adam Czartoryski conta~w Balkan peoples in order to 
encourage their struggles for national independence and to decrease 
Russia's influence in eastern Europe. Czartoryski and his colleagues 
approached Serbian leaders with the idea of fonning a Yugoslav union. 
Ilija Garasanin, Serbian Minister of the Interior, based the official 
policy of th1Serbian government on the ideas of Czartoryski. The Na~er­
tanije OMemorandum) of 1844 called for the eventual creation of a Greater 
Serbia composed of Serbs in all the lands surrounding the Serbia of his 
day, later to be expanded to include all the South Slavs, under the Serbian 
dynasty. Predicated on the idea that the Ottoman Empire must be dis­
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solved, it was hoped that the newB~kan state would be strong enough 
to resist the influence of those two powers most directly concerned 
with the Balkans, Austria and Russia. 
Garasanin's Nacertanije became the basis of Serbian policy through 
the reign of Ale~ande~and Prince Michael's policies were based on simi­
lar ideas. In urging the political union of all South Slavs, Garasanin 
asserted the principle of religious freedom, vital to attaining the co­
operation of the non-Orthodox peoples of the area. Garasanin's plan was 
marked by a paradox: at the same time he stressed the leading rol~ of 
Greater Serbia in the winning of independence and the reconstruction of 
the medieval Serbian kingdom he sponsored the notion of a union of all 
the various South Slavic peoples. Serbian nationalism and Yugoslavism 
involve an inherent contradiction which even today is a source of ten­
sions in Yugoslavia. 
To put the principles of the Na~ertanije in action, Garasani~irst 
worked to free Serbia of excessive Austrian control by opening a trade 
route to the Adriatic through Scutari and Dulcigno, giving Serbian 
merchantS an alternative to Austrian trade routes. Serbian agents were 
planted in the lands inhabited by Slavs to gain a sense of the mood and 
living conditions of the neighboring peoples, to appraise their military 
preparedness, to compile lists of th~ most influential men, and to learn 
popular opinion about Serbia and its role in the Balkans. 
Starting in 1839, Serbian youths were sent to univiersities in 
western Europe on government scholarships. By 1848 about one hundred 
Serbians had been educated in France or Germany. These Serbs returned 
to their homeland brimming with the romadic and liberal ideas 
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of the period. They fonned a nucleus of educators and poli·· 
ticians who exalted the heritage of the Serbian nation and who saw the 
future of the Serbian national state in the national assembly of popu­
larly elected representatives of the people. 
These young nationalists, some of whom taught at the Lycee in 
Belgrade and thus spread their ideals among youngsters of another 
generation, were Serbia's first native intellectuals. In 1847 they 
formed the Society of Serbian Youth and expressed their desires for 
freedom of the press, school reforms, and representation in govern­
ment. They established secret ties with the Serbs of Austria and sent 
them money, supplies and volunteers during their struggle of 1848. 
The revolutionary year 1848 gave Serbians a chance to demonstrate 
their solidarity with their brothers in Austria. When the Magyars 
refused to recognize the national identity of the Serbs of the Vojvo­
dina or any Serbian national rights, a general uprising swept through 
the Vojvodina. The metropolitan of the Serbian church in the Voj- . , 
vodina called a Serbian National Assembly in May. About ten 
thousand Serbs streamed into Kar10vci from all directions to what turn~d 
out to be a tremendous show of Serbian nationalism. In the next several 
weeks t,he assembly "restored" the Vojvodina, the Banat and Backa with 
Baranja as a Serbian territory and "restored" the Serbian patriarchate. 
They made common cause with the Croats and raised the flag of rebellion 
against the Magyars. 
The border between Serbia and Austria was crossed by many Serbian 
vu1unteers from Serbia a~wel1 as from neighboring lands to aid the cause 




der, was totn by internal dissension. The scene was dominated by do­
mestic political sQuabbles OVer the relative power of the prince and 
the Council and by the feud between the Obrenovic and Karadjordjevit,families. 
Prince Alexander~ aiming to rally popular support against the opposi­
tion party headed by Toma Vucic and Milos, called a national assembly 
in June. The St. Peter Assembly was a great shock to Alexander•. 
General discontent with his rule and a number of specific complaints 
about the cunduct of officials and public affairs were aired. Alexander 
promised to improve tl'e situation, but carried through few reforms. One 
of the complaints of the assembly was that Austrian Serbs occupied 
government posts. This was one of Vucie's criticisms of Alexander's 
regime. The opposition also denounced any support Serbia accorded to 
the co-nationals in Austria. This assemblY's demands indicate that 
many' of Serbia's citizens, alienated by the superior attitude 
of Austrian Serbs who served as officials in Serbia, and tired of po­
litical power contests lnd dynastic disputes, were primarily interested 
in the improvement of local conditions and unsympathetic to the struggle 
of the Austrian Serbs with the Magyars. Militant nationalism did not 
stir the hearts of the delegates to the assembly. 
Yet Alexander, intent on enhancing Serbia t s claim to be the Pied­
mont of the South Slavs but reluctant to commit Serbia too deeply to the 
struggle in Austria, provided arms, ammunition and money for Serbian 
volunteers to fight the Magyars .. , . A prominent government official, 
State Councilor Stevan Petrovic Knicanin, led an army of Serbian volun­
teers from Serbia amd elsewhere in major battles for the Serbian cause. 





started to put a strain on the budget, the volunteer army was withdrawn 
in February of 1849. Consequent events in Austria, the put-down of the 
Magyar rebels by the Russian army and Austrian denial of Serbian demands, 
madeKnicanin's volunteer leadership use1es&. The Serbian national cause 
had met defeat in the 1848 fighting, yet the cooperation of Serbia's 
officials and volunteers enhanced connections with the Croats and other 
Slavic participants in the s~ggle, and was the occasion of open dis­
cussion of, if not general support for, the union of the South Slavs. 
The following years saw the ascendency of the liberal Garasanin and 
French influence in Serbia. But by 1853, Rlssia had masterminded the 
ouster of Garasanin and Serbia found itself in a difficult situation 8S 
Russia and France argued over the protection of the Holy Places and . 
Russia prepared to go to war with Turkey. Serbia managed to maintain 
its neutrality during the Crimean War and thus benefited by the Treaty 
of Paris. This ended the Russian protectorate of Serbia and replaced it 
within a joint protectorate of the Great Powers, thus also throttling the 
hand of the Porte. It also opened the Danube to internat10qi traffic, 
assuring the Serbs a trade outlet to the west and to the Black Sea. 
A constitutional crisis brought about the fall of Prince Alexander. 
The Turkish constitution of 1838 defined the powers of prince, Council 
and ministers in such a way that all were constantly at odds with each 
other. Finally a National Ass~bly was convoked in 1858 to settle the 
constitutional question. The St. Andrews assembly was viewed by the 
young liberal nationalists as a way to promote the power of the Serbian 
people; by the Obrenovicparty as a way to regain the throne; and by 
the people as a way to assure some alleviation of economic problems 
caused by arbitrary or corrupt administration and a market economy. The 
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liberals took the opportunity to call for an annual National Assembly 
with legislative and budgetary powers; a watered-down version was 
passed by the assembly, though it is likely that many of the delegates 
did not understand the significance of this libera~otion. Finally, 
Alexander was deposed and Milos, the idealized symbol of the past, was 
recalled to the throne. Here again is evidence tha.t nationalism was es­
poused, not by the masses) but primarily by the group of foreign-educated 
liberals who sought to combine the ideals of liberalism with Serbia's 
traditional folk democracy at a national level. 
The return of the Obrenovic family to the throne generated popuLar 
enthusiasm for the Serbian government. The name and program of the 
Obrenovi6's sparked the national consciousness of the Serbian masses. 
Michael Petrovich describes the nature of the Serbian peasantryt s na­
tional spiri t: 
'~ilos enjoyed the double advantage of being a historic national 
symbol and an avenger of the people's wrongs. Michael not only 
benefited from his father's popularity but also created his own 
through his highly nationalistic program of war against the 
Turks and the liberation and unification of the South Slavs. 
The peasant of Serbia still saw the nation as an ,extension of 
the patriarchal communal family, and as tradition and experi­
ence taught him to valu~ and respect the authority of the head of 
the household, BO he valued and respected the aUthority of the head 
of the nation." 
Thus the traditional forms of loyalty of a patriarchal society, preva­
lent in Milos's first reign, still predominated in a modernizing Serbian 
society. The state's popularity depended largely on the popularity of 
the leader. But it can be argued that a form of naive nationalism 
among the still illiterate masses of Serbia was stirred up by Michael 
Obrenovic whose ambitious and forward-looking policies of a war of 
liberation from the Tulks and of South Slavic federation roused the 
enthusiasm of the Serbian people. 
8. Thl-d, p. 305 
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The brief reign of Milos was characterized by a general purge of 
the bureaucracy and government leaders. This not only enhanced his 
popularity among the dissatisfied populace but it furthered his inten­
tions of instituting an absolute monarchy. 
When Milos died in 1860 his western-educated son Michael took the 
throne. Unlike his father who was concerned with redressing past wrongs 
and recreating the old order, Michael shaped a forward-looking policy. 
His primary goal was to expel the Turks completely from Serbia and 
indeed from the Balkan peninsula, and to form a South Slavic federation. 
In order to carry through this project he ,reorganized the government to 
make it more efficient and strong enough to spearhead a Balkan war d 
liberation from the TUrks. His domestic policy led to increasing central 
contr-olof government affairs, reduction of the power of the Council, and 
restriction of civil liberties and popular participation in government. 
These policies provoked opposition among the Liberals who, unable to 
criticize the government in the censored press, turned to foreign news­
papers to vent their displeasure. The eventual outcome of centralization 
and repression was an overload on the prince himself and discont~nt amo~ 
the people. 
Meanwhile, however, Michael aggressively launched a nationalistic 
drive to remove the Turks from the Balkans. An imponant step toward this 
end was the militarization of Serbia and creation of the largest standing 
army in the Balkans. This action in itself, building a 90,000-man army, 
inadequately trained and armed as it might have been, raised spirits, 
and inspired a wave of nationalism throughout the country. Petrovich 
records: 
'~ichael's huge army suddenly made every Serb a potential hero 
and liberator. A great sense of national pride swept over the 
country. A spate of patriotic songs whose themes dwelt on Serbian 
past glories raised the emotional temperature of the nation to a 
fever pitch. To 'cross the Drina' into Bosnia became a national 
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slogan. Even army maneuvers were a great event. Prince Michael 
cut quite an inspiring figure in his resplendent unif~rm of red 
tunic, white breeches, plume-topped shakQ, cape, gem-encrusted 
sword, and diamond-studded spurs. His program gaVe the Serbian 
people a sense of historic mission, deB tiny, and self-esteem, 
which found its most visible expression in the army. Militarism 
became a way of life; at least outwardly, educated Serbs even 
lik'ed to boast of being a modern Sparta, the Piedmont of the 
South Slavs or, better yet, the Prussia of the Balkans. fl9 
In order to implement his plans to form a Balkan military alliance, 
Michael first had to secure the removal of the Turkish garrisons from 
Serbian territory. An incident occurred in which the Turkish garrison 
in the Belgrade fortress opened fire on the city in 1862. The Serbs 
demanded that all Turkish troops be removed from Serbia - the Turks 
wanted the Serbian army to be abolished. The Great Powers intervened 
with a compromise, reducing the number of Turkish garrisons and limiting 
them to four key fortresses. In 1866, after years of negotiations be­
tween Belgrade and Constantinople over the status of the Turkish inhabitants 
of Serbia, the international situation changed, giving the Serbs a 
chance to have the Turkish troops peacefully evacuated once and for 
all. In 1866 Austria, the porte's supporter in this matter, lost 
to Prussia, and a Cretan uprising distracted the TULks. Michael re­
quested politely that the Porte remove its troops but leave its flag 
flying next to the Serbian flag, allowing Serbian troops to take over 
the defense of the territory. The sultan accepted this face-saving of­
fer and, though still nominally subject of the Porte, Serbia was free 
of direct Turkish interference in the formulation of domestic and for­
eign po licy• 
Meanwhile, Michael started to make contacts and plans for his Bal­
9. Ibid, pp. 315-316 
kan war of liberation. Thruughout his reign Michael cultivated relations 
with Montenegro, Bosnia, Hercegovina, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. But 
his plans came to naught, for the national interests of the various Bal­
kan peoples were a dividing force which was overridden only by ,the 
leadership of Michael, who was assassinated in 1868. Though Michael's 
plans did not come to fruition, he left behind a Ser.bia known for its 
leadership in Balkan liberation schemes and a people instilled with the 
spirit of nationalism and a sense of historic mission. 
After Milos's first reign, the growing group of Serbian intellectuals 
organized in an effort to promote and cultivate the Serbian language and 
culture. The Society Df Serbian Letters was founded in 1842 and published 
a journal, "Glasnik," from 1846 to 1862 with articles on grammar, Serbian 
and Slavic history, geography and natural science. In addition, separate 
collections of Serbian folk literature and translations of western liter­
ature were published. An early project which the society finally aban­
doned was a basic dic1iQlary of tie Serbian language. Linguist Vuk 
Karadzic opposed the orthography used in this dictionary, for it was 
more complex (using 35 letters) than the simpler orthography of 30 
letters which Karadzic was working to have accepted as official. The 
dictionary was abandoned, and in 1859 Vuk Karadzic's persistence finally 
paid off, as his was made the official orthography in Serbia. 
The Society of Serbian Letters had 85 members at the most and suf­
fered from the still low scholarly level of many of its members. Yet it 
played a vi tal cuI tunal role in Serbia a.nd helped to form a cultural 
basis for Serbian nationalism. In literature, poetry, theater, music 
and art, native Serbian culture was preserved and national pride flourished. 
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During Michael's reign steps were taken to improve education in 
Serbia. ~ese included the founding of a Great School in 1863, and 
greatly expanding and regularizing elementary education. A 
number of gymnasia, secondary and vocationa1~hools were established, 
including a high school for girls. The literacy rate rose from vir­
tually zero in the early years of the century to 4.2% (50,796 people) 
in 1866: Literacy in the towns was much greater (26.7%) than that in 
the country (1.6%).10 
So by the time Serbia had rid itself of all Turkish garrisons, much 
progress in culture and state organization had been achieved, though 
Serbia still lagged behind the Vojvodina as a Serbian cultural center. 
Modernization, with the transformation to a money economy and the growth 
of trade, resulted in social dislocation in the earlier static peasant 
society. The zadruga no longer provided semti. ty and was an anachronism 
in a modernizing Serbia, and it started to dissolve. When this hap­
pened" the loyal ties of the peasantry could be transfered from the 
local to the national, especially as local leaders 'had become simply 
agents of the central government. Finally, the creation of a great 
army and a great dream to form an independent Serbian state leading 
a federation of Balkan nations,' inspired in the Serbian people a sense 
of nationalistic mission previously unknown in Serbia. 
.... 
10. Ibid, p. 349 
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THE ROMANIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT 
The struggle for the national independence and political union of 
the Romanian p,eople was spearheaded by the native nobility. It began 
in the early nineteenth century as a movement for autonomy and the re· 
placement of Phanariot princes nominated by the Porte with native 
princes elected by the Romanian boyars. Gradually, with increasing 
exposre to western ideas and Russian domination, the national movement 
spread, primarily among the lo~er boyars, and extended its demands to 
include social reforms, political union of all Romanian people and 
independence. These demands were voiced during the UUl8 revolution in 
Wallachia, but with the defeat of the revolutionary provisionary gov­
ernment, the nationalists' desiderata contracted to include only a 
basic program of political union of the two Principalities under a 
foreign prince. The first of these desires was ~ulfilled in 1861 
when, after a successful attempt by the Romanian divans to go beyond the 
stipulations of the Great Powers made in a series of settlements start­
ing with the Treaty of Paris in 1856, the Porte recognized the union 
of the Romanian Principalities under native prince Alexandru loan Cuv,a. 
The peasantry, which comprised the vast majority of the population, 
was not concerned with nationalism except as a way to achieve economic 
relief and agarian reform. Peasants participated in several revolts, 
the leaders of which espoused national principles, but only if relief 
from the feudal exploitation of the existing system was promised. 
Nationalism emerged when it did in the Romanian Principalities for 
several reasons. One was the discovery by members of the Romanian 
clergy in Transylvania that the Romanian language is derived from Latin 
JB
 
and that Romanians could trace their history back to the Roman conf'lUest 
of Dacia. The 1791 demand of the Romanians in Transylvania that the 
Romanian nation be recognized and granted fundamental rights in the Babs­
burg Empire inspired the first nationalist acts in Wallachia. 
o.ther factors included the e:lq)loitive regime of the Phanariot 
princes appointed by the Porte. Also the influence of western ideas 
grew as greater contacts with western Europe were developed, and in­
creasingly liberal and national principles were applied to the Princi­
palities by boyars educated in France or Germany. Finally Russia, 
which in the 1830's had given Wallachia and Moldavia constitutional 
governments, a more modern and efficient administratio~ and perhaps 
most importantl~ parallel governmental institutions, by 1848 presented 
the greatest threat to Romanian independence. These are among the most 
important determinants of the sha.pe of ROManian nationalism in the nine­
teenth century. 
Bac~ground 
At the beginni~of th~ nineteenth century, the Romanians were split, 
part being ruled by the Habsburgs and the other part cuming under the 
suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire. The Romanians of Transylvania were 
mostly serfs and were not recognized as one of the nations of the 
Austrian empire which enjoyed political rights and privilegds. The 
Romanian Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were tributary to 
the Ottoman Empire, and at the turn of the century were dominated by 
the Greek phanariot princes appointed by the Porte. This paper 
is concerned principally with the growth of nationalism in the Principalitie~. 
.,'1 
But early developments in Transytvania were vital to the growth of 
nationalism in the Principalities and will be discussed first. 
In 1699 and 1701 the clergy of the Orthodo~ church of the Romanians 
was invited to recognize the Pope as its head in exchange for increased 
civic rights •. The clergy of the new Uniate church. educated in Rome, 
in the middle and late eighteenth century learned of their peop1e'a 
early history and of the Latinity of their language and 
published grammars and history books. In 1791 representatives of the 
Romanians of Transylvania submitted the SuppleY_Libellus Valachorum 
to Leopold II requesting equality of rigHs with the privileged nations 
of the Habsburg Empire and representation in the Diet in proportion to 
the number of Romanian taxpayers. The reouest was rejected. A few 
months later a Wallachian petition was submitted to the Russian and 
Austrian delegations at Sistova reouesting autonomy and neu trali ty for 
t~allachia. the right to elect Illti'le princes flO m among the boyars, and 
the limiting of duties to the Porte to a specified tribute. It should 
be noted that the Wa1lachian re(!uest for national rights was for rights 
for the poli tical nation. limited to the upper classes of Romanian 80­
ciety. 
Transylvania, thus. was the cradle of Romanian nationalism. which 
rested on the historical basis that the Romanian people date back to the 
Roman occupation of Dacia in the second and third centuries. and the 
Latinity of the Romanian language. Major Transylvanian contributers 
to this line of thought were Samuel (Inocentiu) Micu-Clain. Petru Maior. 
> 
and Gheorghe Sincai. Their books and views had particular influence in 
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Wallachia after 1818 when Transylvanian Gheorghe Lazar started teaching 
,.,4 
-' 
at the School of St. Savain Bucharest. 
The Principalities had fallen under the suzerainty of the Ottoman 
Empire in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries The conditions of the 
tribuary agreement, which to this day are debated among historians, 
apparently provided that the Porte would help defend the Principalities 
in exchange for a yearly tribute. No pashaUk was set up and Turks did· 
not settle in the Principalities, leaving matters of internal admini­
stration to the native princes. But by the beginning of the nineteenth 
century the porte exerted extraordinary political and economic influence 
in the Principalities. The princes or hospodars of Wallachia and M01­
davia were appointed by the Porte from among the Greeks who lived in the 
sedion of Constantinop.le known as Phanar. The phanariot princes paid 
healthy bribes to Turkish officials t~in their pOSitions, and in order 
to recoup expenses and make a profit the . Phanariots reouired the peasants 
to pay ever higher taxes and duties. 
The Phanariots first came to rule in the Principalities in 1711 when 
the Turks felt the~ou1d no longer trust that the native princes wuuld 
be loyal. The social structure of the Principalities was as fol1oW5~ 
A small group of boyars, the native nobility, owned most of the land. 
There were three ranks of boyars. The highest rank. in general held 
hereditary titles and owned great tracts of land. According to one 
11about one half the land was owned by just 15 to 20 families. ­source,
 
the lower ranks of the nobility grew during the period of Phanariot
 
rule, as the Phanariot princes granted rank in exchange for large bribes,
 
to supplement their income. About 180 families thus owned another
 
11. Barbara Jelavich, Russia and the Rumanian National Cause 1858-1859, 
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12 one ~uarter of the land in the Frincipalities. Among those who entered 
the nobility during this period were members of the Phanariot bureau­
cracy. These became known pejoratively as "ciocoi" and .were the objects 
of peasant frustration and mistrust during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. The boyara were exempt flOm taxes, leaving the 
peasantry to pay the taxes, duties and other payments demanded by the 
Phanariots for themselves and for the sultan. Descriptions of peasant 
life under the Phanariots are grim, as the princes often demanded more 
than the peasa~ts could produce and still provide for themselves. 13 
The blame for the abuse of the masses of the Principalities should not 
fall solely, or perhaps even to the greatest degree, on the phanariot 
Greeks. Rather, the whole system of Turkish administration was based 
on the exploitation of the peasantry for private gain. Later, when 
native princes once again reigned in Wallachia and Moldavia, they too 
. multiplied their wealth at the expense of the peasantry. Thus exploita­
tion was institutionalized in the Principalities and as a result, the 
agrarian problem was to become the most fundamental issue during the 
rest of the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. 
The phanariots were responsible for some advances in Romanian so­
ciety. For instance, it was Constantin Mavrocordat who reduced serf­
dom in the 1740's. The Phanariots, while painting a gloss of Greek 
culture on Romanian high society, introduced French literature in the 
Principalities and established several schools, albeit with instruction 
in the Greek language. 
12. Ibid. p.5 
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Ottoman economic influence was not limited to the exaction of tayes 
and tribute. As the Ottoman Empire shrank, loaing fertie agricultural 
lands in north Africa and the Crimea, greater demands were made on the 
grain production of the Principalities. The POrte reouired delivery 
of a certain amount of agricultural produce every year, and paid less 
than its market value. Thus grain, which was a prime re~uirement of the 
Porte, was not so profitable for the Romanians to produce. In general, 
the livelihood of the Romanian peasants depended on animal husbandry, 
and the availability of much meadow and grazing land pro~ed this branch 
of the economy. 
There was no developed Romanian merchant class. Rather, Greeks and 
other foreigners dominated trade in the Principalities. At the same time, 
the Orthodox Church in the Principalities fell under the direction of 
Greek clergy, and about one quarter (Wallachia) to one third (MOldavia) 
of the land was owned by the Greek Church and all income went directly 
14
into the coffers of foreign monasteries. The fact that Greeks in 
general occupied towns and cities and conducted church services in a 
language unintelligible to the great majority of Romanians, as well as 
Greek diversion of a good part of the income produced by Romanian lands 
away from local coffers, alienated the Romanians from the 
Greeks. This alienation was to make itself Quite evident in 1821. 
In the early nineteenth century Russian influence started to make 
itself felt among the people of the Prlncipalities. During the years 
from 1806 to 1812 Russian troops occupied the Principalities and sup­
ported the Serbian rebels in their struggle with the Turks. In fact, 
14. B. Jelavich, op. cit. , p. 104 
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it was the possibility of allying with the Russians that helped trans­
form the Serbs' fight for a just administration into a struggle for 
national independence. Romanian pandours, fighting men from 01tenia, 
assisted Russian troops in the Pashalik of Belgrade. Thus they were 
exposed to Russian military tactics as· well as inspired by the national­
istic struggle of the Serbs. Thus was initated the 1eader-to-be of 
Romania's 1821 revolt,. Tudor V1adimirescu. 
So at the beginning of the nineteenth century the Romanian Prin­
cipalities were ruled by Greek Phanariots, native boyars owned most of 
the land, and the peasantry was at the mercy of both. Nationalism 
was not present at all except among very few boyars, who were interested 
in restoring political power to the native princes and eliminating 
Phanariot rule. 
The Revolt of 1821 
The revolt of 1821 in Wa11achia meant different things to the 
various groups of participants. Its ultimate achievement, the restora­
tion of the rule of native princes and the expulsion of the Phanariots, 
fulfilled the limited national demands of the boyars, lending a national­
istic character to the rebellion. Yet the majority of rebels did not 
consider national aspirations to be important; their cuncern was the 
termination of economic servitude and the feudal system. An examination 
of Tudor V1adimirescu's revolt reveals a good deal about the role,of 
nationalism in Wa11achia of that time. 
Plans for the 1821 revolt were made by Romanian boyars and merchant~ 
associated with the Phi1ike Hetairia, a Greek nationalist organization 
founded in Odessa, with the purpose of giving support to a Greek up­
rising against Tukis-h rule. It was originally hoped that the uprising 
wvuld spread to all the Balkan Christian peoples and receive moral and 
military support from the Russians, especially as the leader of the 
Greek uprising, Alexander Ypsilanti, had a personal sympathizer in 
Tsar Nicholas 1. But as we have seen, Milos Obrenovic prevented any such 
anti-Ottoman revolt from seeing the light of day in Serbia in order 
to capitalize on Ottoman goodwill to enhance his own power and to achieve 
the autonomy of Serbia. Ypsilanti made the tactical error of announcing 
Russia's support of the liberation struggle at the outset, rather than 
raising a revolt which the Russians would generously help the Turks to 
Conservative Russia could not openly support a revolutionary movEment, 
control. Iso the revolt was limited to Romania and Greece, not without 
important consequences for both peoples. But the outcome of the up­
rising in Wallachia was not anticipated by Ypsilanti or the Romanian 
boyars who enm uraged it. The key is the t while the boyars who ini tiated 
the uprising were pursuing national goals in order to reassert their 
own power, the peasantry who carried through the rebellion wanted only 
to eliminate all exploiters, including Phanariots, ciocoi and native 
Romanian boyars. The boyars wanted a national revolution, the peasants 
a social revolution. And the leader of the revolt, Tudor Vladimirescu, 
described by current Romanian historians as a member of the rising petite 
lS
bourgeoisie, was caught in the middle. Tudor Vladimirescu, though of 
peasant origins, had been educated and had become relatively wealthy. 
ne had served as a lieutenant in the Russian army in Serbia, and was 
inspired by the national struggle of the Serbs, which by 1816 had re­
15. Constantin Giurescu, Contributiuni la studiul originilor $i dez­
voltarii burgheziei rome ptna la"184_~, Bucharest;'1972, p. 2~'-
suIted in the semi-autonomy of Serbia. His desires were both social and 
national: he favored ta~ reform, the establishment of a national army, 
a national assembly representative of all classes, and a native hospodar. 
Vladimirescu planned the revolt after an agreement with several 
boyars who had connections with the Philike Hetairia. He would Taise 
the people in rebellion; the boyars would supply the means. Ypsilanti 
had hoped that the revolt would be pro-Greek and anti-Turk, but he was 
unaware of the widespread alienation of Romanians toward the Greeks. 
The revolt was timed with the death of the hospodar of Wallachia to stress 
the desire of the Romanian boyars for the selectibn of a native prince. 
Vladimirescu agreed that action of the rebels would be directed against­
Phanario~8 and only those boyars who had taken e~treme measures against 
the peasants. But Vladimirescu's Pades
) 
Proclamation generated overwhe1m­
ing support for the movement among the peasants for the abolition of the 
feudal order. 
His speech incited the peasantry to vi~uaily uncontrollable acts 
of destruction of boyar residences and feudal records. Vladimirescu 
asserted that "No laws can prevent you from returning evil for evil. If 
a serpent crosses your path, hit it and kill it, for if it bites you it 
will probably endanger your life. But these dragons - our ecclesiastical 
and political chiefs - who have devoured our rights, how long shall we 
let them suck our blood, how long shall we remain their slaves?"16 
At the same tim~ Vladimirescu addressed an assurance to the comman­
ding Turkish pasha at Vidin, similar to the early pledges of loyalty 
to the Porte that Karadjordje made in 1804, that the rebellion was di­
16. Quoted in David Mitrany, The Land and Peasant in Romania, New York, 
1968, p. 24 - -­
rected against the boyars, not against the Turkish suzerain. Thus, al­
though conceived as an anti-Phanariot rebellion by the Romanian boyars, 
and an anti-Ottoman rebellion by Ypsilanti, in practice the uprising 
was directed against all oppressors of the peasantry regardless of 
nationality. 
Vladimirescu occupied Bucharest for several months, cooperating 
with th~ boyars who had established a provisional government there. 
Though regarded by many as Prince Tudor, Vladimirescu eventually lost 
popular support due to his attempt to prevent peasants from ravaging 
the estates of friendly boyars and also to his efforts to convince the 
peasantry to accept the rule of native boyars. He thus compromised 
the social program of the revolt which had animated the masses. Mean­
while, in the face of Turkish attack, Vladimirescu left Bucharest, was 
apprehended by Ypsilanti and put to death. 
However, the uprising did lead to the restoration of nativ~hos­
podars in the Principalities. ThiS resulted when the Turks decided to 
pacify the .Romanians and the Serbs so they could devote undivided at­
tention to the Greek uprising which embroiled the southern lands of the 
Balkan peninsula. The Principalities sent committees of six or seven 
hJyars to the Porte to make claims. The two demands which were ap­
proved by the porte were the reestablishment of native hospodars and 
the exclusion of Greeks from civil and ecclesiastical positions. Other 
claims were denied, including the consolidation of boyar privileges 
and the exclusive right of natives to public employment. 
And so the national claims of the Romanian boyars were achieved, 
while the social reform demanded by the peasantry wat denied. 
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The Birth of Romanian Nationalism 
The pattern seen in the 1821 revolt is characteristic of the growth 
of nationalism in the nineteenth century in the Principalities. 
Nationalism spread among the boyars and among the growing Romanian 
middle classes, while the primary concern of the peasantry was agra­
rian refonn and. an economically balanced organization of society. 
When the nationalistic boyars incorporated promises of agrarian refonn 
in their platfonns J the peasantry supported them. But there was lit­
tle support of national ideas for their own sake among the broad masses 
of the peasantry until much later. 
As was mentioned earlier, the first national demand by the in~ 
habitants of one of the Principalities was the 1791 re~uest by Wallachian 
boyars for autonomy and the selection of native hospodars. The boyar 
petition of 1822 (after Vladimirescu's revolt) was similar to the 
earlier one, in that its concern was for the enhancement of native 
boyar power in a tributary Wallachia. 
Nationalism in the Principalities was more and more heavily in­
fluenced by France, the ideals of the French Revolution and the cul­
tural attachment many Romanians felt toward France as a resul t of their 
common Latin heritage. French influence was felt in the higher. circles 
of society, as French was the international language of diplomacy at 
that time and Greek schools often provided some exposure to French 
literature. 
In 1821 for the first time P~manian students received stipends 
to study in France. Through the years many sons of Romanian boyars 
1~8 
were educated in France and Germany, and it is from among these young men 
that the leadership of Romanian national movement emerged. 
An early example of the adoption of French liberal ideas applied 
to the Romanian milieu was the so-called "Carvunarii" or Carbonari 
group of lower rank ~~ldavian boyars. In 1822 they approached the 
Romanian prince Ionita Sturdza with a consitution calling for a diet 
> 
with representatives of all the boyar ranks, e~ual rights for boyars, 
guarantee of individual liberty, freedom of contract, trade and in­
dustry, abolition of sales of offices, observation of titles to pro­
perty, establishment of a state-owned Romanian-language printing press 
and a Romanian-language school system. The last points promoted national 
culture, but the liberal ideas of the C~rvunarii were applied only to 
the elite of Romanian society. French liberalism had lost something 
in its Romanian translation. 'Sturdza refused to accept the constitution 
and exiled some of the leaders. 
At the same time as French cultural and ideological influence 
was increasing in the Principalities, Russian political power there 
was growing. In 1826, when Turkey was weak due to internal contests 
for power between the Janissaries and the central government, Russia 
pressured the Porte to sign the Akkerman Convention, noted earlier 
with respect to its section requiring Turkish recognition of Serbian 
national rights, which enhanced Russian power in the Principalities. 
It gave Russia a say in the selection of princes, and in their deposition. 
In 1827, Constantin:, Golescu, together wi th Ion Heliade Radulescu 
<at teacher at the School of St. Sava) and Stanciu Capa~ineanu, established 
a Literary Society at Gole~ti in Wallachia, the purpose of which 
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was to promote Romanian culture including the development and re­
organization of education, the establishment of a national theater and 
Romanian language journal. Golescu, sometimes called the first modern 
Romanian, was impressed by the overall well-being in western Europe and 
wanted to improve the lot of the Romanian peasantry. He sent his sons 
abroad for their higher education, and they became leaders in the Ro­
manian national movement of the 1840' s. 
In 1828, Heliade published a grammar of the Romanian language, 
promoting the idea of using Latin script instead of the Cyrillic used 
at the time • 
. The Russian army occupied the Principalities in 1828 as it moved in 
to battle Turkey after the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino 
Bay. The Turks were forced to capitulate and in the 1829 Treaty of 
Adrianople, which re-acknowledged Serbia's national rights, granted 
Russia great po~er in the Principalities. The Treaty of Adrianopte 
marks the beginning of a new stage in the history of Romania and the 
development of Romanian nationalism. 
The Treaty of Adrianople restricted Turkey's suzerain rights to 
the collection of tribute and the confirmation of ruling princes. 
The Russian army would occupy the Principalities until the 11.5 mil­
lion ducat war reparations were paid, and a constitution, or Regle­
ment Organiaue (more acceptable terminology for a tsar with an aver­
sion to liberalism) woulu be drawn up with the aid of the Russian 
governor-general. The princes were to be elected for life terms and 
were to rule with the Divan or assembly of boyars. An important eco­
nomic provision was the elimination of the Porte's right to pre-empt 
jt.) 
Romanian produce. This opened up possibilities for the Principali­
ties to find an export market in the west and helped transform the econ­
omy, making grain production the most important branch of the eeonony 
and ruining the peasants' mainstay, cattle breeding. At the s"sme 
time the Black Sea was opened to international trade, giving yet 
another spur to the Principalities' economic life. 
The Reglement Organi~ue for each Principality was prepared by a 
committee of boyars from the respective principality, checked and a1­
tered by Russian Governor-general Pavel Kiselev,and approved by the 
divan. Kiselev set about to improve the administration of the princi­
palities, increasing efficiency and improving the ouality of life for 
the inhabitants. His goal was to give stability to the Principalities, 
and he provided them with parallel institutions to facilitate their 
eventual union. Articles 425. and 426 of the R~glementOrganiQuestate: 
"The origin, the religion, the usages, and the conformity of 
language of the inhabitants in the two principalities, as well as 
their mutual needs, contain not only the principle but the elements 
of an intimate union, which has been traversed and retarded by for­
tuitous and secondary circumstances. The salutary conse"uences 
resulting from the union of these two peoples cannot be held in 
doubt. The elements of the fusion of the 11oldo-Wallachian people 
are already postulated in this reglement by the uniformity of the 
administrative bases of the two states. 
"Identity of legislation being one of the most efficacious means 
for consummating this moral union, a mixed commission will be 
named by the government of the two principlaities (sic) for the 
purpose of formulating the civil and penal code of the two ftates 
in a single and identical body of Moldo-Wallachian laws .•• " 7 
Perhaps it was Russia's intention to assimilate the Principalities one 
day; it was certainly suspected by the growing nationalist organizations 
by the end of the Russian occupation. 
Kiselev accomplished a great deal while in the Principalities. 
17. Quoted in Riker, Ope cit., pp. 19-20 
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He established a working constftutional system of government, improved 
sanitation and took measures to prevent famine, created a judiciary 
system and improved internal security. An educational system was or­
ganized with Romanian as the language of instruction and French taught 
as a foreign language. The Reglement Organioue was in force from 1831 
Until the Crimean War, except briefly in 1848, and established ari elec­
tive princedom, an assembly in which majority rule was rESpected and 
which was subject to executive veto. The assembly had control over 
taxation. A major disappointment for Kiselev was his inability to in-
elude agrarian reform in the Reglement. Instead, the Reglement defined' 
the legal status of the peasant with respect to the landowner, and con­
tributed to the increasing hardship of the peasants' life. For the first, 
time the landholder was described as proprietor of the land rather than 
just village chief, and peasants were described as tenants, owing rent 
and labor duties in exchange for the use of their land.. The peasant's 
. . 18plot was reduced by half, and h~s labor dues mult~plied thirty times. 
The landowner could reserve one third of the land for his own use, while 
the peasants had the right to occupy and work the rest in exchange for 
labor and rent. The number of livestock was limited, since the land­
holder usually enclosed former pasture lands to add tOfhe amount of land 
cultivated in the ever more profitable grain crops. The great boyars 
ran the government. The Russians catered to their desires (especially 
in regard to the agrarian question) in order to maintain influence and 
generate support for Russia. So the lower ranks of the boyars started 
to become alienated from the great boyars and the Russians, as did 
18. Leften S. Stavrianos, The Balkans S!~ce 1453, New York, 1958 
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the peasantry, which was becoming even more downtrodden and exploited. 
The Russian occupation of the Principalities lasted until 1834. 
But Russian influence continued through pressures on the great boyars 
and ruling princes with the additional weight of Cossack troops on 
the Moldavian border to insure good behavior. In 1833, Russia gained 
more power in the Balkans at the expense of the Porte when she asserted 
herself as protector of the Balkan Christians and assumed a vbtual 
protectorate of the Ottoman Empire in the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. 
The ~ks were threatened by the ambitious Mehemet Ali of Egypt, so 
Russia enjoyed increasing latitude and influence. As Russia, a 
reactionary power, appeared to pose a threat to the Romanian nation­
ality, the Romanian national movement became anti-Russian. 
From 1827 until the revolution of 1848 the Romanian national movement, 
though iLS leadership remained in the ranks of the boyars, became ve~ 
dynamic, attracted the support of a growi~Romanian middle cl9ss, and 
experienced growing diversification of views in its ranks. Journals, 
cultural organizations and secret politca1 groups agitated for the 
cultivation of Romanian history, art, language and culture and for in­
dependence, union and social reform. Among the journals were f~ier.ul 
romanesc, 1829-1848, 1859, edited by He1iade in Bucharest; !lbin~ 
romane!!ca, 1828-1858, edited by Gheorghe Asachi in Ia~i; Dacia 1iter­
ara, and Arhiva ro~aneasca, edited by Mihai1 Kog~lniceanu in 1840 in 
Ia~i; Pr02a~irea~ 1844, edited by Kogalniceanu, Vasile Alecsandri and 
Ion Ghica in Ia~i 8,nd ~agazin istoric pentru D~cia, 1845-1851, edited 
by August Treboniu and Nicolae Ba1cescu in Bucharest. These journals 
contributed to the Romantan literary adva,ncement, promoted national 
consciousness through romantic vision of the history of the Romanian 
people, and voiced the nationalistic hopes of the young boyars. The 
publications of the :thirties were characterized by admiration of France 
and their tendency to look westward. In the forties the focus shifted 
to an appreciation of the Romanian character, exemplified by the folk 
poetry recorded and published by Vasile Alecsandri and in the lomantic 
historiography of Mihail Kog~lniceanu. 
Organizations devoted to the promotion of Romanian culture were 
formed, like the Romanian Philharmonic Society of Ion Ctmpineanu, Cos­
tache Aristia and Heliade which was active in Bucharest from 1833 to 
1838. Formally its purpose was to encourage literature and the arts, 
'I 
but it also advocated the unification of the Principalities, a con­
stitutional government, freedom of the press, free education and 
e~uality before the law. The influence of French liberal thought on 
the program of the nationalists wevident. The political activities 
of thelhilharmonic Society caused it to be banned, and after its sup­
pression, secret political organizations w~re formed to carry on its 
activity. In 1838 Ctmpineanu's National Party,' composed of liberal 
boyars and bourgeoisie, formulated a document known as the Union and 
Independence Act which called illegal both the Reglement Organique ~ 
.and Russia's appointment of Wallachian prince AlexandruGhica,. It 'called" for 
union of the Principalities under an elected prince whose title was 
to be hereditary, and for the adoption of a constitution which pro­
vided for universal suffrage and the freeing of bondsmen. CtmPlneanu 
was arrested and the movement floundered. The inspiration for the 
Union and Independence Act came from the attempts of Polish Prince 
.)/+ 
Adam Czartoryski to organize a general Balkan uprising ~o win 
national independence for the various nationalities in the late 
1830's. 
Conservative nationalism conttued to exist alongside the more 
liberal nationalism of the western-educated. In 1839 an attempt was 
made by a conservative group in Moldavia to overthrow Prince Mihai1 
Sturdza and set up an aristocratic state subordinate to the Porte" 
ruled by boyars who would be equal 1n rank, in a confederation of 
Moldavia, Wallachia and Serbia. The so-called Confederative Con-­
spiracy led by Leonte Radu incorporated some of the liberal ideas 
of the west, but did not apply them to society as a. whole but only 
to the boyars. It demanded e~ua1ity of rank among boyars and aCon~ 
federation similar to the German Confederation. 
In 1840 in Wa11achia a liberal group of young followers of Ctm­
pineanu led by Dimitrie Fi1ipescu planned an armed uprising to achieve 
their goals of an independent republic of Wal1achia, and the abolition 
. of the feudal order and of all boyar ranks and privileges. This move­
ment was nipped in the bud and the leaders arrested. 
It is significant that some of the nationalists demanded recogni­
tion of the rights of the ~.asantry and the need for social reform. 
This was indicative of a ~eater absorption of liberal ideals by 
Romanian nationalists, coupled with the circumstances created by a 
changing economy which the lower boyars and bourgeoisie began to 
realize made feudal relationships counterproductive. 
The educational system was a medium for the spread of nationalism 
in the Romanian Principalities. The Reg1ement Organi~ue had already 
») 
provided for instruction in Romanian system-wide. In 1835 the 
Academia Mihaelan~ was founded in Iasi. This school was a spring­
~ 
board for nationalism in Moldavia. In 1843 Mihail Kog~lniceanu pre­
sented his first lecture on the national history of the Romanians 
there. 
Meanwhile, Romanian students were organizing in Fa-ris. From 
1835 to 1838 Alphonse de Lamartine, Edgar Quinet and Jules Michelet 
supported the Revolutionary Romanian Circle whose participants included 
Ion Ghica, C.A. Rosetti, Nicolae Cretu1escu, Costache Negruzzi, Mihail 
) 
Kog~lniceanu, Alexandru loan Cuza and Nicolae Balcescu - all to figure 
Prominently in the 1848 revolution or the ~uccessful bid for union in 
1857-1861. In 1839 the Society for the Study of the Romanian People 
was formej in Paris. 
In 1843, back in w~llachia, the underground revolutionary organi­
zation Fratia (Brotherhood) was formed, led by Ion Ghica, Nicolae 
~ 
Balcescu and Christian Tell. Its slogan was ~ustice, Rraternity and 
it aimed to install a liberal democracy in Wallachia. In 1845 the 
Literary Association of Romania was founded; it cooperated with Fratia 
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and favored the union of the Romanians. An organization similar to 
Fr~~ia, the Patriotic Association, was founded in Moldavia in 1846, 
but it was short-lived as its members were arrested or exiled. 
By 1848 liberalism and nationalism were well-ensconced in the 
ranks of the lower boyars who sought the chance to bring the benefits 
of these ideologies to their people in Romania. 
_: ,.1 
The Revolution of 1848 
Several Romanians participated in the February Revolution of 1848 
in Paris. The various organizations of Romanian nationalists, inspired 
by the revolutionary spirit bursting forth in different corners of 
Europe, attempted to make liberal refonDs in the Principalities. 
The 1848 revolution in Moldavia was more of an unsuccessful plea 
for reform than a revolution. A group of boyars and members of the mid­
dle class met in April to formulate a refonD program calling for improve­
ment of the Reglement Organique, including economic and judicial reform, 
ministerial responsibility, improvement of the condition of the pea­
santry, creation of a national guard and an end to corruption. The 
conservative nature of the demands of the Moldavians resulted from their 
proximity to Russia, the more conservative GenDSn educations of the main 
leaders, and the fear of eytreme social dislocation which arose after the 
Galician peasant uprising of 1846. The group was loosely organized and 
easily broken up. Moldavia became a bastion of conservatism and Rus­
sian influence while the would-be reformers went into eyile, ranging 
from the mild demands of April to an ultra-radical declaration advocating 
union with Wallachia, abolition of all privileges, establishment of a 
government based on liberty, e~uality and fraternity, and an end to all 
feudal obligations, distributi~ land to the peasants without compensation. 
This declaration was inspired by the May mass meeting of Romanians at 
the Field of Liberty in Blaj, Transylvania. 
Finally, the program of the Molda~ians was defined clearly by 
Mihail Kogalniceanu. The core of their demands was union with Wa11achia 
and rejection of the Reglement Organique and the Russian protectorate. 
To achieve these goals, the Moldavians decided to cooperate with the 
57
 
Wallachian revolutionaries in hopes of spreading the revolt to Moldavia. 
The Wallachian revolution enjoyed greater immediate success than 
that in Moldavia, but it too ended in disappointment. The revolution­
aries in Wallachia were in gener~l more radical than those of Moldavia, 
as more had studied in Paris, and they were better organized. There we~e 
at least two groups who cooperated in the movement - the moderates led 
by Ion Heliade Radulescu and the radicals represented by Nicolae 
Bilcescu. Heliade's participation ensured the~pport of the shopkeepers 
and artisans of Bucharest for the revolution. 
The peasants were restive, for they continued to live in poverty 
and in servitude to the landlords, while the Romanian serfs of Transyl­
vania had been freed of feudal obligations and granted full ownership 
of the land they worked by Ferdinand '1 in March, 1848. The Transyl­
vanian held several mass rallies demanding the recognition of the 
Romanians' status as a nation, which heightened the tension in the 
Principalities. Bucharest's population was also in a dangerous mood 
as the corruption of Prince Bibescu's regime fomented widespread dis­
content, and as laws raising the tuition for an education, aimed at 
limiting educational opportunities to the wealthy, put several hun­
dred resentful youths into the streets. 
Fratia put together a list of demands and in the Islaz Proclamation 
~ 
of June demanded complete independence for Wallachia, emancipation of 
the peasantry, abolition of boyar privileges. an elected prince, a 
general assembly representative of all social strata, ministerial re­
sponsibility, freedom of the press and education, political rights for 
all citizens including Jews and gypsies, formation of a national guard 
,{\ 
and the summoning of a Constituent Assembly to formulate a Constitution. 
Prince Bibescu reluctantly conceded to the demands of the revol­
lutionaries, first appointing a revolutionary government and then ab­
dicating. The provisional government lasted from mid-June to mid-Sep­
tember, changing personnel and reducing demands in an attempt to ob­
tain recognition by the Porte. A committee of boyars and peasants was 
established to discuss possible agrarian reforms, but no program was 
suggested, as most of the revolutionary leaders still did not consider 
agrarian reform to be vital to the revolution. One of the very few 
who did recognized the significance of the agrarian problem was Ion 
Ionescu, whose views are summarized by JohnC. Campbell: 
"Ionescu showed that he understood the economic basis of the 
Roumanian revolution to be the conflict between boyar and ~easant, 
contrasting it with the situation of capitalists against workers 
in France, but stressing the similarity on one point, namely that 
in both cases revolution was caused by the fact that labor did not 
get a fair share of the wealth it produced. He recognized an 
organic connection between nationality and social r~form. With­
out the latter, he wrote, there can be no future, there can be 
no nationality. The solution lay in the establishment of harmony, 
which in France found expression in the organization of labor, in 
Roumania in the abolition of feudal dues and the creation of a balance 
between property and labor, '''i th a citizenry of peasant proprie­
tors. 'The boyars swear to the constitution,' he said, 'eycept for 
the article on property, that is, they want liberty only for them­
selves.' ,,19 
The provisional government was ousted in September by Turkish 
troops, sent under pressure of Russia which could not tolera.te revo­
lution at its doorstep. Russian troops also occupied the Principal i­
ties and the revolutionary leaders were forced to flee the country, 
many remaining in exile in Paris for ten years. The revolution had failsd 
to achieve its goals, but it did implant and popularize the concept of 
19. John C. Campbell, French Influence and the Rise of Roumanian Na-. 
tionalism, New York, 1971, pp .-2"OT·20i-- ----------.- - -- ._­
of the nation and the desirability of uniting all Romanians in one state. 
The revolutionaries learned a hard lesson in 1848. Unable to 
agree among themselves as to the types of social reform that were 
desirable to institute, then failing at their attempt to bridge a 
huge gap of social development in a matter of several months, many 
abandoned their demands for social reform. A new, more narrow and 
thus achievable program was formulated by the exiled revolutionaries 
after 1848. They desired the union of Moldavia and Wallachia under the 
leadership of a foreign prince. They gained support from Napoleon III, 
who persistently promoted the cause of Romanian unity in deliberations 
with the Great Powers and so helped the Principalities to achieve union 
in 1861. 
From 1848 to Union 
Romanian nationalists in Paris continued their efforts to promote 
the cause of the Romanians in Europe, as well as in the Principalities. 
A number of newspapers and reviews were pu~lished in Paris in the years 
after 1848, some of which found their way to sympathizers in the Prin­
cipalities. In addition, literary and historical reviews and books were 
published in Romania which heightened Romanian national self-conscious­
ness. 
Russia occupied the Principalities until 1851, then returned in 
1853 at the outset of a new war with Turkey over Russia's 
right to protect the Christians of the Holy Places, a right which ~ 
France also ~laimed. The circumstances which led to this con­
frontation's transformation into an international war, pitting Britain 
and France against Russia, need not be discussed here. But the change 
6U 
in relations between the European powers wnich occurred as a result of 
this war was relevant to the ultimate success of the Principalities' 
bid for union. 
Austria threatened to enter the war against Russia unless Russia 
withdrew from the Principalities. This was done, and Austria's army 
moved in to replace the Russian occupation forces. This marked the open~ 
ing of a rift between Austria and Russia which made possible the union 
of the Principalities. For as long as Russia and Austria had cooperated 
with regard to the Balkan territories,. Russia respected Austria's fear 
of nationality proble~s in the multi-national Habsburg Empire which 
.could be sparked by Romanian nationalist victories in the Principalities. 
Therefore, Russia opposed union•. Russia viewed Austria as a traito~ now 
and no longer considered Austrian objections as an impediment to Rus· 
sian policies. The union of the Principalities was now possible. 
Russia lost the Crimean War. The Congress of Paris dictated the 
end of Russia's protectorate of the Cqristian peoples of the Ottoman 
Empire and of the Principalities in particular and substituted it with 
a join~ guarantee of the Great Powers. In addition, the D~nube was 
opened to international trade, the part of Bessarabia fronting on the 
mouth of the Danube being transferred back from Russia to MOldavia. 
The matter of the political organization of the Principalities turned 
out to be too controversial to settle at the Congress. France supported 
union and a foreign prince. Austria opposed any form of union. Turkey, 
backed by Britain, supported the status ~uo. Russia connived to drive 
a wedge between France and Britain, and posed as representing the in­
terests of the Romanians and supported the consultation of the Romanians 
f) 1 
themselves. The British suspected Russia's motives in its apparent 
support of union and thus toughened its position against union. 
It was decided to postpone a final decision on the political re­
organization of the Principalities so that the treaty could be finalized. 
An international commission was appoi,llted to investigate conditions in 
the Principalities and to relate the desires of the people. as expressed 
by divans elected by citizens of every social level, to the Powers. 
This signaled the start of various factions' attempts to control the 
election, or at least to influence it. Austria, still occupying the 
Principalities, opposed union and took measures to assure an anti-union­
ist majority. However, the Powers insisted that Austria evacuate the 
Principalities (which it had hoped to add to the Habsburg domains) be­
fore the election. French representatives worked for a pro-uni'Jn vote.. 
But the princes, who were in charge of drawing up lists of electors had 
the most control and the Moldavian Prince Vogorides was faithful to the 
Porte and Austria, which had given him power. Thus, as many unionists 
as possible were removed from the electoral lists. 
" 'The lists,' wrote one eminent Roumanian author, 'constituted 
a yeritable insult to the prescriptions fo th~reaty of Paris, which 
ruled that the divans ad hoc should be the most faithful expression 
of the opinion of all classes of society. Of 2,000 great propri­
etors in Moldavia, they contained the names of only 350; of the 
20,000 and more small proprietors. they had inscribed only 2.264 
Among the electors of the cities one had found to register in the 
whole state of Moldavia only 11 persons who exercised the liberal 
professions, In all the lists were comprised (but) 4,658 electors 
of the upper classes instead of 40,000 which they should have con­
tained. One made, it is true, a great parade of the 167,922 pea­
sants inscribed; but these latter, seeing the manner in which they 
had to choose their delegates, signified absolutely nothing.' ,,20 
The Moldavian election was held first, and it was a foregone conclu­
20: Rike~op. cit .• pp. 111-112 quoting A. Xenopol 
I,l 
sion that the anti-unionists would win. 'But the manipulation of the 
election so alienated the people that a good many pro-unionists ab­
stained from voting. 
"Of the 193 priests registered (out of a total of 3,263 ) 
only 17 voted; of the 465 electors among the 3000 great pro­
prietors, but 207 cast their votes. Even to the end, the offi­
cials of the government interfered to influence the results, and 
a case was cited where a self-appointed committee tOOK possession 
of the ballots at one of the polling places of Jassy and wrote 
on them the name of the anti-union candidate. But the absence 
of the great majority of citizens frum the elections was a ridi­
culous commentary on the means devised for securing the opinions 
of the province. As a medium for regi~tering the wishes of 
Mo~davia theplebisci te was a farce." 1 
After much debate, in which Napoleon III agreed to stop insisting 
on complete union under a foreign prince in exchange for annulment of the 
election, it was ~ecided by the powers that the election should be re­
staged. This opened the field to renewed agitation efforts. Nationalists 
actively promoted the cause of union despite governmental interference. 
Near Iasi in 1856 a society called Unirea (Union) was formed to or­
~ 
ganize the struggle for union. In 1857 the Central Committee·of 
the Union was established in Bucharest, just as the exiles of 1848 were 
allowed to return. Nationalists went into the countryside to agitate 
for union, lending a populist air to the movement. A unionist newspaper, 
Concordia or Romanul, was published by C.A. Rosetti in Bucharest in 1857 
which continued to appear until 1915. With these organizations and 
newspapers, clubs and discussion circles the cause of union was popu­
larhed. 
In 1857, thus, new electoral lists were drawn up and elections held. 
In both principalities union was overwhelmingly supported. The primary 
concerns of the divans were autonomy, union, a foreign prince and 
21. Ibid~p:-T25 
representative government, and the Moldavian divan included a fifth 
point, neutrality of the Principalities. 
The Powers once again met. Their final decision, despite the wide 
support of union in the Principalities, was to keep the Principalities 
administratively separate, each with its own elected prince and 8 paral­
.lel set of institutions, with a Central Oommission at Focsani, on the, 
border between Wallachia.and Moldavia, to deal with matters of common 
interest. However, when newly-elected divans met to select the princes 
in 1859, the naticnalistic desire to achieve political union outweighed 
the petty power struggles of the various boyars, and a compromise. 
candidate, Alexandru loan Cuza, was elected by both divans. The prin­
cipalities had achieved personal union, though it was to be two more years 
before the Porte would recognize the administrative and poHtical union 
of the Principalities. This came only'aften Cuza had carefully avoided 
offending the Powers, keeping the ardent nationalists from trying 
to move too fast in declaring union, while coping with the difficult 
and exhausting domestic task of ruling with two capitals and legis­
latures. 
Thus the first demand of th~omanian nationalists was fulfilled: 
Moldavia and Wallachia were united. The energy of the young boyars, 
educated in tm west and infected with liberal and national ideas, 
combined with the support of Napoleon III and a favorable state of 
international affairs, made this achievement possible. The spread 
of nationalistic ideas among the boyars and middle classes, and even 
among the peasants, through revolutionary activity in 184& made that 
possibility a reality. 
~_____ -c..­
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CONCLUSION: SERBIAN AND ROMANIAN NATIONAL MOVEMET:rrS COMPARED 
The rise of nationalism in the Pashalik of Belgrade and the 
Principalities of Wallachia and rlolclavia during the first siY decades 
of the nineteenth century followed similar lines of development. De­
spite important differences in the situation of the Serbs and the 
Romanians, the development of nationalism in general proceeded in 
similar stages as each people strove to achieve national independence. 
At the beginning of the nineteenth century nationalism was limited 
to the native political leaders, expressed in bids to increase the 
power of the native upper class or individual power, and was in­
fluenced in a superficial way by the intelligentsia of the same national 
tty ,living outside the Ottoman Empire. Thus Karadjordje and Milo~ 
Obrenovic made claims for national autonomy which were supported by the 
linguistic and educational work of Dositej Obradovic of the Vojvodina. 
Groups of boyars in the Romanian Principalities who petitioned the 
Porte for the replacement of foreign leaders with native ones and for 
increased autonomy were inspired by demands of Transylvanian Romanians 
for national rights within the Habsburg Empire, which in turn were 
rooted in the historical and linguistic discoveries of the Transylvanian 
Latinists Micu-Clain, Maior and Sincai. 
~ 
The Vojvodina Serbs contributed to the modernization of Serbia a,nd 
the evolution of Serbian nationalism to a greater extent than the 
Romanians of Transylvania affected the development of nationalism in 
the Principalities. Great numbers of teachers and bureaucratic func­
tionaries crossed into Serbia, thus helping to lay the educational and 
governmental foundations for the sprarl of nationalism in Serbia. 
:J) 
Financial and material assistance of Serbian merchants in the Voj­
vodina provided the Serbs with the means to fight the Turks. The 
Transylvanian influence in the Principalities was more limited. A few 
teachers, like Gheorghe LazKr, came to the Principalities and by 
teaching in the Romanian language and introducing Latinism, started the 
snowball of Romanian nationalism rolling. In addition, the struggle 
of the Transylvanian serfs in 1848 inspired the nationalists of the 
Principalities to dream of the formation of a Greater Romania, composed 
of all the Romanian people. 
Among the Serbian and Romanian peasantry, nationalism had not 
yet appeared. Most Serbs had a national consciousness, as a legacy 
of the Serbian oral tradition and epic poetry. But the peasants of both 
nationalities were concerned with eliminating extreme oppression, not 
in formation of a national state. In both lands peasant revolts took 
place, but these were not bamd on the ideals of forming an independent 
national state. The peasantry wanted only to restore normality to' 
rural life; peasants desired to be left alone by tax collectors and de· 
manding landholders, to ~d1te outside interference, be it by foreigners 
or conationals, from his daily life. In 1804 the Serbs rose up against 
Janissary misrule, not against the Turkish sipahis who had lived in 
the Pashalik for centuries. And when Milo~ enforced a centralized regime 
/
in Serbia, with taxation and corvee, the peasantry again revolted in.the 
mid-1820's. Thus the. Serbian revolution was national only in the sense 
that the boundaries between oppressor and oppressed happened to follow 
national lines: on one side were the Serbs and on the other side the 
Janissaries and Turks. The revolt was not nationalistic, except per­
n) 
haps among the leaders and intelligentsia, for the masses of Serbs 
did not envision the recreation of a Serbian state. 
The participants in the revolution of 1821 in Wa11achia, as has 
been shown, represented boyars, the nebulous middle class and the 
peasantry, and each had its own interests. The peasantry, as in Serbia, 
was concerned only with eliminating the e~loiter, be he Phanariot 
Greek or Romanian. His interests thus were identical with those of the 
Serbian peasantry. But his revolt could not be construed as national for 
it aimed at Romanian boYars in addition to foreigners: the lines of 
social conflict were not neatly drawn between nationalities. 
Yet the 1821 resurrection did achieve certain nanona1 goals ­
the goals of the native boyars who wanted to see one of their own num­
ber'on the thron~. It is the existence of a class of large landholders 
in Romania, and the concomitant absence of Turks in the Principalities, 
that distinguished Serbia and the Romanian lands so sharply. But even 
so, by the end of M1lo~'s reign a group of notables or government leaders 
had emerged in Serbia which represented a point of view similar to that 
of the Romanian boyars. 
NatioIllism is rooted in the language and his tory of a people. 
The Romanian and Serbian movements both share an early concern with 
the development of a national literary language and the exploration and 
romanticizing of ~he nation's history. The' works of Dositej Obrado­
vic and Vuk Karadzic are of extraordinary importance for the cultural 
foundation of the Serbian national movement. Likewise the Transylvan­
ians Micu-Clain, Sincai and Maior were instrumental to the birth of a 
7 
Romanian literary language and historical consciousness, while later 
67
 
contributers included Mihail Kog'lniceanu, Nicolae Balcescu and V,sile 
Alecsandri. A romantic appreciation of the cultural achievements of 
the peasantry was inspired by Karadlic and Alecsandri who pioneered the 
collection of folk poetry. 
At the time Serbia was granted autonomy with the aid of Russia, 
the Romanian Principalitis were put under a Russian protectorate. 
Here the development of nationalism in the two regions diverged. For 
Serbia, autonomy meant the consolidation of native rule, and infighting 
be~een Milof and the growing liberal group known as the Constitutional~ 
ists. Russia was benevolent and distant, Slavic and Orthodox~ But 
for the Principalities, Russian meddling was the ~~le, and though during 
the years under Governor-general Kiselev Russian influence was considered 
to be beneficient and in fact laid the administrative groundwork for 
union, as time passed Russia seemed to threaten the national develop­
ment of the Romanians~ and a general anti-Russian attitu~e permeated 
Romanian society. This sentiment was articulated by the young liberals 
of the Principalities. This brings up another similarity between the 
Serbian and Romanian movements. 
Since 1821 in the Principalities, and since 1839 in Serbia, a 
number of young natives received their higher education in the west, 
most notably in Paris, but also in other French and German 
universities. The Romanians were sons of lower ranked boyars, the 
Serbs generally were sons of govellUnent officials. These young men 
imbibed the liberal ideals current in the west and were moved by the 
romantic nationalism of the period. French influence was of parti ­




young liberals returned to their homelands ready to apply these newly­
adopted principles to their relatively primitive societies. In each 
country they formed a nucleus of nationalistic and liberal reformers. 
In Serbia the nationalists organized the Society of Serbian Youth 
in 1848, a.dvocating support of the Serbs of Austria in their fight with 
the Hungarians, and in the spirit of Serbian folk democracy they sup­
ported the convocation of the St. Andrews National Assembly which was' 
to depose Alexander Karadjordjevic in 1858. 
In the Principalities the liberal nationalists staged several 
fruitless revolts during the 1840's and formed a short-lived provisional 
government in Bucharest during the tumultuous year 1848. They continued, 
stressing social reform less and union of the Principalities more, to 
agi tate in Europe for foreign support and again in t~ Principali ties 
in the 1857 and 1858 elections which led to the achievement of union. 
France had a much deeper attraction to Romanians than to the Serbs, for 
the Romanians looked to their brothers of Latin heritage as cultural 
models, and as the possible source of Romanian union .and independence. 
A special feeling of solidarity thus linked the Romanians and French, 
and this solidarity helped the young Romanians to gain the suppor-t of 
Napoleon III for the Romanian cause, support which was vital to the suc­
cess of the nationalists. 
Polish efforts to generate a Balkan uprising influenced the course 
of events in Serbia and the Principalities. Prince Adam Czartoryski 
lobbied actively among the Balkan peoples after the Russian smashing of 
the Polish revolution in 1830. Czartoryski inspired several Romanian 
revolts in the early 1840's and was the inspiration for the national 
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policy of Serbia's Minister of the Interior Garasanin, set forth 
in the Nacertanije of 1844. Here a difference can be observed 
between the two nationalities. For the Serbian government, or at least 
certain members thereof, was receptive to nationalist ideas and was 
willing to adopt a natLona1ist stance in its foreign relations. This 
resulted in part from the relative autonomy Serbia enjoyed. On the other 
hand, the governments of the Principalities put down any show of nation­
alist spirit, due to the degree of influence Russia enjoyed among the 
government official. there until 1854, and the nationalists formed an 
active opposition party. Only when RusSian influence was replaced 
by the joint guarantee of the Great Powers was it possible to fo.J:'u 
a nationalistic government in the Principalities. 
The peasantry of both nationalities suffered due to economic 
changes occurring in their respective countries. In Serbia, the 
barter economy wa.s being transformed into a money economy, and as 
a result indebtedness became an immense problem. Government abuses 
during the reign of Alexander Karadjordjevic compounded the misery of . 
the peasantry which was angry enough by 1858 to depose Ale,rander (who 
by the way also failed to take a strong national stance in the 1848 
revohtion). The discontent of the peasantry was cleverly channeled 
by Michael Obrenovic into nationalistic fervor. Although domestically 
the regime was even more oppressive than before, the reason for re­
strictiveness was to build up Serbian strength to lead a Balkan war of 
liberation against the Turks. 1be process of modernization, which 
broke down the traditional loyalties to the extended family, eypanded 




of many peasants, facilitated the redirection of loyalties to the nation. 
Economic changes in the Principalities occurred as the result of the 
abolition of Turkish monopolies on trade coupled with rising demands 
for grain in western. Europe. The great landholders increased their cul­
tivated holdings and reduced the peasantry to debt-ridden, overworked 
tenants. Faced with utter poverty, the Romanian peasantry was restive, 
and in 1848, when the nationalists promised to give the peasantry land, 
the rural population supported the revolutionaries. Neither agrarian 
reform nor national union was achieved, but as long a.s the peasants 
associated agrarian reform with union, the nationalists could count on 
their support. Again, discontent caused by economic changes could be 
rechanneled into nationalistic causes. 
Though the peasants of both cuuntries suffered dislocation and 
hardship, the roots of their proqlems, it must be emphasized, were 
strikingly different, and as time passed and the societies developed. 
the differences would become amplified. The Serbs were a nation 
of freeholders who were struggling to a.dapt to a modernizing society in 
which, they were free agents. But the Romanian peasantry was bound by 
the boyars and suffered increasing exploitation as the boyars took ad­
vantage of a chanB~ng economy to amass greater wealth at the expense 
of the peasants. The overriding concernof the Romanian peasant was to 
end his servitude and to gain the right to own land. Although the pea~ 
sants had supported natiunal union in 1848 and 1857, it was as a 
means to improve their posi tion in society as promised by the na·· 
tional liberals. On the other hand, the Serbia,n freeholders had rallied 
to the nati-unal cause in Hichael' s drive to fonD. a national liberation 
1-­
army a,S the national mission in itself captured the imagination 
of the peasantry and rallied the Serbs to action. 
The final stage of the Romanian nationalist movementaefore 1860 
has no e~uivalent in the Serbian movement. The vote to determine 
the Romanians' feelings about the political organization of their coun­
try and the fait accompli of the duuble election of Ale~andl~ loan Cuza 
were unique phenomena resulting from the deadlocked discussions of the 
Powers. euza, an avowed nationalist, managed his diplomatic affairs 
somewhat like Milos had, ingratiating the sympathetic powers by keeping 
the lid on nationalistic activity at home. And like Milos, Cuza's 
strategies brought him success and Romanian unification. 
By the 1860'S both th~ Serbians and Romanians had achieved partial 
fulfillment of their nationalist goals. But the granting of autonomy 
for Serbia and union for Romania only whetted the nationalists' ap­
petite. Both hnd yet to win complete independence and expand their 
borders to include all the peoples of their nationality. Nationalism 
had come to stay in these Balkan nations. It had been born, experi­
encedthe innocence of childhood and the trials of youth, and was 
now on the threshold of adulthood. The degree to which the fun­
demental differences in economic development and social structure in 
Serbia and Romania were to affect the maturing national movements 
in future years is left for another study to appraise. 
Despite certain important differences in the organization of 
society, the national movements of Serbia and Romania developed under 
fundamentally similar condition~: foreign oppression, outside intel­





language, an appreciation of national history, and the vibrant ro­
mantic liberal idealism among native leaders; the dislocation caused 
by economic changes and modernization which broadened the outlook of 
the people; and the benevolence of a foreign advocate who was able 
to put the young nation on its feet on the international stage ·though 
limiting the possibilities for the nationality's self-assertion. 
MOst importantly, the national movements of Serbia and Romania eMerged 
as a result of a single historical process: the decline of the OttOMan 
Empire and the international struggle to fill the power vacuum left 
in the Balkans. Thus the national awakening of the Serbian and 
Romanian peoples and their struggles for independence until the 1860's 
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